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THE TURN TO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: TRANSCENDING THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
James G. Stewart*
ABSTRACT
In November 2013, Swiss authorities announced a criminal investigation
into one of the world’s largest gold refineries on the basis that the
company committed a war crime. The Swiss investigation comes a matter
of months after the US Supreme Court decided in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. that allegations like these could not give rise to civil
liability under the aegis of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). Intriguingly,
however, the Swiss case is founded on a much earlier American
precedent. In 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the novel practice
of prosecuting companies. Unlike the Court’s position in Kiobel a century
later, the arguments that ultimately led to the open-armed embrace of
corporate criminal liability were unambiguously concerned with impunity.
For the U.S. Supreme Court, doing without corporate criminal
responsibility would create a significant and highly undesirable
regulatory gap. Since then, the American fiction that corporations are
people for the purposes of criminal law has taken hold, such that the
concept is now relatively ubiquitous globally. Even jurisdictions that
bravely held out for decades on philosophical grounds have recently
adopted corporate criminal liability. Switzerland is one such case.
In this paper, I argue that coupling corporate criminal liability with
international crimes in national systems, as in this new Swiss case, is the
next obvious “discovery” in corporate responsibility. In addition, at least
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one international court has now adopted corporate criminal liability for
international crimes. These developments promise to transcend several of
the doctrinal and conceptual problems that plagued the ATS. First, this
reframing will move this field beyond polarized debates about the scope of
complicity within ATS litigation, which did not fully capture the nuanced
meaning of accomplice liability in the criminal law. Second, it will bypass
the cumbersome debate about corporate responsibility for international
crimes as a matter of international law, which would not arise in criminal
trials. Third, while trading the private right to sue under the ATS for
prosecutorial discretion in a criminal context is certainly a massive loss,
prosecutorial discretion also has its upsides, which we should now
explore in greater depth. Finally, reframing ATS cases in international
criminal law (principally enforced in national courts) offers corporate
guilt and retribution as a justification for accountability, thereby
answering many of the criticisms scholars leveled against the ATS
process.
Corporate criminal liability (in conjunction with individual criminal
responsibility of corporate officers for international crimes) always had
certain competitive advantages over the ATS, that the Swiss investigation
confirms as legally plausible. So, regardless of whether this particular
investigation ever results in a trial or conviction, it announces an
uncharted set of relationships between commerce, atrocity and
international criminal law waiting to be mapped. As I show, by
simultaneously mimicking and transcending the ATS, corporate criminal
liability for international crimes offers human rights advocates a fresh
platform for justice, while also contributing very new perspectives to
scholarly debates about the propriety and efficacy of ATS litigation. All in
all, the rise of corporate criminal liability for international crimes offers
new ideas about the importance of corporate accountability globally,
which understandably, never figured within the relatively narrow framing
required for the ATS or business and human rights more generally.
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“There is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm;
there has to be.”
Judge Richard Posner1

I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEXT LEGAL “DISCOVERY”
In November 2013, Swiss prosecutors announced an investigation into
a corporate war crime. According to the formal complaint that initiated
the investigation, the giant Swiss gold refining company, Argor-Heraeus,
was responsible for pillaging Congolese gold.2 Pillage means theft during
war.3 After the Second World War (“WWII”), Allied courts prosecuted
1

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
See Swiss Gold Refiner Accused Of Abetting Congo War Via Money Laundering,
FORBES, Nov. 4, 2013 http://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2013/11/04/swiss-goldrefinery-accused-of-abetting-congo-war-via-money-laundering/ (last visited Jan 21,
2014); Swiss refiner “laundered DRC gold,” BBC, Nov. 4, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24811420 (last visited Jan 21, 2014);
Angélique Mounier-Kuhn, Le raffineur d’or tessinois Argor visé par une enquête pénale,
LE TEMPS, Nov. 4, 2014. For an outline of the allegations against Argor-Heraeus, see
KATHI LYNN AUSTEN, THE PILLAGE OF EASTERN CONGO GOLD: A CASE FOR THE
PROSECUTION OF WAR CRIMES (2013), http://www.stop-pillage.org/media-kit/. For my
own commentary on the development, see James G. Stewart, Punish Companies That
Pillage,
N.
Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
14,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/opinion/punish-companies-that-pillage.html
(last
visited Jan 21, 2014). The case results from the hard work of a number of people,
including Kathi Austen at the Conflict Awareness Project and Philip Grant at TRIAL, but
Ken Hurwitz at the Open Society was the driving force behind it.
3
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pillage “is
committed when private or public property is appropriated intentionally and unlawfully.”
Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, ¶ 82. (Dec. 17,
2004). Traditionally, various rights to seize property during war contained in the Hague
Regulations of 1907 colored this definition of pillage. See Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović
et al. Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgement, ¶ 51 (Mar. 15 , 2006) (“In the context of
international armed conflicts, the taking of war booty and the requisition of property for
military use may constitute limitations to that principle.”); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No.
IT-95-11-T, Judgement, ¶ 102 (June 10, 2007) (“[a] party to the conflict is also allowed
to seize enemy military equipment captured or found on the battlefield as war booty, with
the exception that the personal belongings of the prisoners of war may not be taken away.
According to the Hague Regulations, forcible contribution of money, requisition for the
needs of the occupying army, and seizure of material obviously related to the conduct of
military operations, though restricted, are lawful in principle.”) Unfortunately, the ICC
Elements of Crimes attempted to circumvent these complicated standards by demanding
2
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various businessmen for pillaging natural resources from throughout
Occupied Europe—including coal, iron ore, and oil—all of which
bankrolled Hitler’s war machine.4 In the modern era, too, individuals have
faced charges for pillaging property of various sorts from conflict zones,5
but curiously, the crime’s application to commercial actors in the
extractive industry has remained a forgotten relic of post-war legal
experimentalism. The failure to enforce the war crime in commercial
contexts before now was profoundly unresponsive to the dynamics of
that “[t]he perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it
for private or personal use”. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICCASP/1/3, at 138-139 and 150. I have argued at length that, while probably not significant
in the corporate context, the inclusion of the element of “private and personal use” is
neither consistent with the laws of armed conflict nor any other definition of pillage in
international criminal law. JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING
PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19–23 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1875053
(providing a full doctrinal history of the meaning of pillage). I therefore agree with the
Special Court for Sierra Leone that “the requirement of ‘private or personal use’ is
unduly restrictive and ought not to be an element of the crime of pillage.” See Prosecutor
v. Brima et al. Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 754 (June 20, 2007); Prosecutor v.
Fofana et al. Case No.SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 160 (Aug. 2, 2007). All this to say,
treating pillage as theft in war is safe, provided one understands that certain exceptions
exist in the laws of armed conflict.
4
See e.g. U.S.A. v. Von Weizsaecker et al. (Ministries Case), 14 Trials of War Criminals
314, p. 741 (1949) (convicting Paul Pleiger, the manager of Mining and Steel Works East
Inc., for pillaging at least 50,000 tons of coal from mines located in Poland during the
war.) France v. Roechling, 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, app. B, (1949), pp. 1112–1113 (finding
Hermann Roechling for pillaging over 100 million tons of iron ore from the Société
Lorraine Miniere et Métallurgique in Moselle, France.); International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg) Judgment (1946), 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the
International Military Tribunal (1945), p. 228 (convicting Walther Funk for his role in
the management of a commercial enterprise named the Continental Oil Company, which
exploited crude oil throughout occupied Europe in conjunction with the German army.)
For a table of all known pillage cases, involving theft of natural resources as well as other
forms of property, see JAMES G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING
PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 95–124 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1875053.
5
In an earlier project, I established that modern international courts and tribunals have
considered at least 69 allegations of pillage in modern conflicts, in addition to the
numerous cases that arose after WWII. For a table of these cases, see Id. at 96–124. The
most notable modern examples of pillage cases occur before the International Criminal
Court, where former Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the sitting
President of Sudan are indicted for pillaging property other than natural resources. See
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC02/05-01/09, 4 March 2009, at 7 (confirming pillage charges against Al Bashir);
Prosecutor v Bemba, Warrant of Arrest for Jean‐Pierre Bemba Gombo Replacing The
Warrant Of Arrest Issued on 23 May 2008, ICC‐01/05‐01/08, 10 June 2008, at 9 (also
confirming the charge of pillage against Bemba).
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modern warfare; since the end of the Cold War at least, pillage of natural
resources has substituted for Superpower sponsorship as a predominant
means of conflict financing.6
Thus, it is hard to resist seeing the Swiss investigation in historic terms,
regardless of whether it ever blossoms into a conviction. Locally, the case
marks an unmistakable shift away from the history of Swiss dealings in
pillaged gold during and after WWII.7 On a more global level, the ArgorHeraeus case is one of the first criminal cases involving corporate
responsibility for international crimes,8 and the first time that a company
6

See generally, PHILIPPE LE BILLON, WARS OF PLUNDER: CONFLICTS, PROFITS AND THE
POLITICS OF RESOURCES (2012) I. Bannon and P. Collier, “Natural Resources and
Conflict: What CanWe Do?” in I. Bannon and P. Collier (eds), Natural Resources and
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions 1-16 (Washington: The World Bank, 2003); M.
Ross, “The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor in Natural
Resources and Violent Conflict”, in Bannon and Collier (eds), ibid., 17-42, at 30; D.
Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (London: International
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998). For a remarkable anthropological study of how this
correlation plays out in practice, see CAROLYN NORDSTROM, SHADOWS OF WAR:
VIOLENCE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL PROFITEERING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(2004).
7
For two examples from a voluminous literature, see IAN SAYER & DOUGLAS BOTTING,
NAZI GOLD: THE STORY OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST ROBBERY - AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1984); ISABEL VINCENT, HITLER’S SILENT PARTNERS: SWISS BANKS, NAZI GOLD, AND
THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1997).
8
In 2009 and 2010, the NGO Al-Haq filed criminal complaints against Lima Holding
B.V. and its managing directors for complicity in war crimes associated with the
construction of the Wall in Isreal and Palestine. Although the prosecution opened an
investigation, it ultimately decided not to procedure. Dutch prosecutors cited several
factors for reaching their decision, the most important of which was that the company’s
contribution was minor. In this sense, it did not constitute complicity at all. In many
respects, I view this case as a paradigm of causal contributions that fall below the
“substantial”
contribution
threshold.
For
further
details,
see
http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/internationale/map/concerning/.
More
broadly,
international criminal courts have continually flirted with corporate criminal liability.
See, in this regard, J. A Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094–
2081 (2009). In fact, the trial of various businesspeople was nearly staged as a second
major trial at Nuremberg itself, before these cases were relegated to zonal trials. On this
history, see DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE
FORMATION OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY 28–32 (2003) (Bloxham’s chapter is
entitled “’The Trial that Never Was’: The Aborted Second Major Trial of Major War
Criminals”). For discussion of the political agendas that played out in the trial of
“industrialists” that did occur, see Grietje Baars, Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? The
Hidden Stories Behind the Prosecution of Industrialists Post-WWII, in THE HIDDEN
HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 163–192 (Kevin Jon Heller & Gerry Simpson eds.,
2013) As an aside, I place the word “industrialists” in inverted commas because I suspect
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has ever faced criminal scrutiny for pillaging natural resources from war
zones.9 So, beyond the significance of pillage for the extractive industry,
there is a sense that Argor-Heraeus opens Pandora’s box—a set of
undiscovered relationships between commerce, atrocity, corporate
criminal liability and international criminal law waiting to be mapped. No
matter how this particular investigation plays out, the very fact of a formal
investigation confirms the plausibility of these cases, sounding the
beginnings of a brave new turn in thinking about global corporate
accountability.
By chance, the rise of this new form of accountability coincides with
the contraction, if not demise, of the far more popular avenue for hearing
these types of cases. In 1980, human rights advocates stumbled upon an
unused provision within the Judiciary Act of 1789, which they quickly
harnessed to litigate “foreign cubed” human rights cases.10 This provision
mandates that US federal courts enjoy jurisdiction over “civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”11 After some terminological inconsistency,
the provision came to be known as the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).12 At
that, whether deliberately or not, the archaic language distances these precedents from
modern commercial practices.
9
There were, of course, a large number of business people prosecuted and convicted of
pillaging natural resources after WWII. For a detailed analysis, see JAMES G. STEWART,
CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES (2010). See
also, Larissa van den Herik & Daniëlla Dam-De Jong, Revitalizing the Antique War
Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to
Address Illegal Resource Exploitation during Armed Conflict, 22 Crim. L. Forum 237–
273 (2011).
10
The term “foreign cubed” is used to describe cases in which foreign defendants are
sued by foreign plaintiffs for torts committed on foreign soil. The phrase has become
common in this literature. See Vivian Grosswald Curran & David J Sloss, Reviving
Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 858–863, 858 (employing this
term); Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of
the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645–1670, 1647
(2014) (also referring to “foreign-cubed” cases); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the
Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations, 28 MD. J. INT’L L.
1–27, 2 (2013) (same). At times, the power is reduced from three to two. See e.g. Oona
Hathaway, The Door Remains Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remainsopen-toforeign-squared-cases/.
11
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
12
As Tom Lee has explained, courts initially called the provision the Alien Tort Act and
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), before the Supreme Court adopted Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) as its preferred descriptor. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien
Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 832, 3 (2006) (“The provision has also been called the
Alien Tort Act, Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995); Alien Tort Claims
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first, litigants employed the ATS to pursue individuals that they claimed
were responsible for egregious human rights violations from Bosnia to the
Philippines, using the law of nations as a jurisdictional hook on which to
hang their human rights suits.13 At a later stage, the promise of greater
compensation to victims, the obvious financial incentives for lawyers and
no shortage of corporate offending saw a turn to the commercial side of
global repression.
For most of the past several decades, this civil option peculiar to the
United States was uncontestably “the main engine for transnational human
rights litigation.”14 Amongst human rights scholars, enthusiasm for the
ATS litigation became immense, presumably because of the dearth of
other options for redress. At its zenith, the ATS appeared to offer litigants
a raft of comparative advantages over and above legal arrangements for
corporate accountability on offer elsewhere. These advantages (perceived
or real) included universal civil jurisdiction over “foreign cubed” cases,
access to resources on the New York Stock Exchange worth contesting,
and a bundle of procedural privileges without equivalent elsewhere.15 In
April 2013, however, the US Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal
statute, Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986); and
Alien Tort Claims Act, Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 512-13
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). The use of Alien Tort Statute in this Article conforms to Supreme
Court nomenclature. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004);
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436 (1989).”).
13
See e.g., Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving genocide allegations
against a private individual for the first time within ATS litigation); In re Estate of
Ferdinando Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir, 1994) (involving
proceedings against the estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos).
Apparently, as many as one hundred cases were filed against dictators and military
officials when their regimes fell, suggesting that ATS litigation was initially very much
part and parcel of the transitional justice movement. According to David Weissbrodt,
these cases were largely symbolic, seldom resulting in awards for damages. See DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 81617 (2009)
14
Ingrid Wuerth, The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601,
601 (2013).
15
On procedural advantages available in the United States that made ATS so popular, see
Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,
28-33 (2002) (discussing the potential for U.S. procedure to overcome the difficulties
with pre-paid legal fees, loser pays rules, the absence of contingency fees, high legal
fees, the absence of punitive damages, limited discovery and difficulties with the uptake
of international law, all of which create important carriers outside the United States). For
a helpful comparative overview of some of these procedural arrangements, see Deborah
R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 7 (2009).
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Dutch Petroleum Co.16 brought an abrupt end to the exuberance, sparking
a clamor for alternative forms of corporate accountability in a world
where justice for corporate wrongdoing is very much the exception not the
rule. In this spirit, some have asserted that tort litigation in U.S. state
courts could fill the ATS’s shoes,17 others reasonably look to Europe for
alternative civil opportunities,18 while still others have lauded the demise
of the ATS’s very unilateral assumption of responsibility for global
corporate offending, calling for more multilateral responses to the sorts of
difficulties that animated the ATS.19
But what role for the ATS’s brother-in-arms, international criminal
law? Perhaps, through a process of mimicry and transcendence, the ArgorHeraeus case gestures at this powerful but still ill-considered option.
Although it is still far too early to say, there are good reasons to think that
this particular successor could outperform its predecessor.
Certainly, there are many points of commonality between international
criminal law and the ATS, even before the latter’s recent fall. Historically
speaking, the genesis of the ATS is the subject of very different
readings,20 but the statute’s initial application several centuries ago bears
an eerie resemblance to the facts in Argor-Heraeus. On 6 July 1795, the
then U.S. Attorney General William Bradford authored an opinion
16

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl III Childress & Michael D. Ramsey, After
Kiobel - International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and under State Law, 3
UC IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013); Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights
Litigation: A Concerning Trend, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 25 (2013); Paul L. Hoffman &
Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and is State Courts,
3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013).
18
Robert McCorquodale, Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States, 107
AM. J. INT’L L. 846–851; GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO
JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS
(2013),
http://accountabilityroundtable.org/analysis/the-third-pillar-access-to-judicialremedies-for-human-rights-violations-by-transnational-business/; Caroline Kaeb &
David J Scheffer, The Paradox of Kiobel in Europe, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 852–857.
19
Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality, 28
MD. J. INT’L L. 208 (2013).
20
This historical literature is rich and diverse. See e.g., Anne-Marie Burley (now
Slaughter), The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83
AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 464 (1989) (arguing that the ATS was passed to allow the U.S. to
fulfill its “duty”, to conduct itself in a manner “befitting a civilized nation”, with “honor
and virtue.”); For alternative readings of this history, see Lee, supra note 12 (suggesting
that ATS was intended to ensure safe-conduct of foreign actors, especially where the
U.S. government shared responsibility for the wrong in question); Joseph Modeste
Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 445 (1994) (arguing, based on a detailed historical review, that the ATS was
intended to only govern a class of prize cases involving seized vessels).
17
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advising that the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 could supply a
remedy to British merchants for acts of “plundering” carried out in Sierra
Leone.21 Legally speaking, plunder is a synonym for pillage.22
Coincidentally, then, pillage, transnational commerce, and warfare in
Africa mark the beginnings of the ATS and, quite possibly now, corporate
criminal liability for international crimes.
The ATS and international criminal law (“ICL”) also overlap
substantively. After Bradford’s opinion, this mysterious provision in the
Judiciary Act all but disappeared. In 1980, almost two centuries later,
courts unearthed, dusted off and redeployed the lost ATS provision,
relying on Bradford’s now famous argument as precedent. Logically,
litigants spent much of the ensuing years contesting the scope of this farreaching new basis for civil liability, but after much dispute, consensus
emerged that the ATS at least covered international crimes like war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.23 In other words, Argor21

Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795). Curtis Bradley has offered an
informative presentation of the context surrounding Bradford’s opinion. See Curtis A.
Bradley, Attorney General Bradford’s Opinion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J.
INT’L L. 22 (2012).
22
See, for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s conclusion that that “the
prohibition of the unlawful appropriation of public and private property in armed conflict
[…] has been variously referred to as ‘pillage’, ‘plunder’ and ‘looting.’” Prosecutor v.
Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, para. 751 (June 20, 2007). Unhelpfully,
post-WWII trials used the term spoliation as a further synonym, but when it came to
defining the term legally, courts found that “spoliation is synonymous with the word
‘plunder’ as employed in Control Council Law No. 10, and that it embraces offenses
against property in violation of the laws and customs of war of the general type charged
in the indictment.” United States v. Krauch et al., (IG Farben), 8 Trials of War Criminals
1081, p. 1133. For a more complete discussion of this unnecessarily confusing
terminological equivalence, see STEWART, supra note 3, at 15–18.
23
Although there is some controversy surrounding the types of “violations of the law of
nations” that will give rise to actionable ATS claims, courts have consistently found
international crimes can ground an ATS suit. As a general matter, courts initially required
that an international law norm had to be “specific, universal and definable” to be
actionable. See e.g. Doe v Saravia 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1153-57 (E.D. Cal. 2004). In
2004, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa agreed that the ATS only extended to a
“narrow class” or violations of international law, which include norms “of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms” that originally inspired the ATS. Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). While some decisions have excluded commercial fraud,
misrepresentation and unjust enrichment from the scope of ATS suits, others have
consistently found that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are actionable.
See e.g., Kadić v Karadzić, 70 F3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that that the District
Court has jurisdiction over genocide), Sarei v Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp 2d 1116, 1149
(C.D. Cal 2002) (finding that medical blockade constituted genocide, because
“deliberately calculated to destroy plaintiffs and their way of life.”), Mehinović v.
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Heraeus is not just factually similar to the context in which the ATS was
first applied; both systems of accountability appeal to the same branch of
international law. Stated differently, both are based on a latent legal
“hook” that lay fallow for decades, before it was uncovered to allow
domestic courts to read international crimes into the local legal system.
The Argor-Heraeus case is thus a reenactment of the legal “discovery”
that brought about ATS litigation in the modern era. According to one of
the pioneers of ATS litigation, the Statute was first applied to corporations
in the 1980’s after a perplexed Burmese activist approached a student at
Georgetown Law School. During that discussion, the Burmese activist
apparently confessed his profound confusion that the U.S. legal system
allowed a couple to recover when their dog died by over-anesthesia at the
hands of a veterinarian, whereas massive social upheaval caused by an
American company in Burma went completely unaddressed.24 The student
adroitly pointed to the ATS, proposed the obvious (but then novel)
application to corporations, and a major movement was born. Although
the “discovery” motif has obvious limitations, once again, its resonance
with the rise of corporate criminal liability for international crimes in the
Argor-Heraeus case is striking.25
Vucković 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (holding that acts of torture, degrading
treatment and illegal imprisonment as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing constituted
crimes against humanity, which were actionable pursuant to the ATS); Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that an individual killed
by Augusto Pinochet’s regime in 1973 was a victim of a crime against humanity, and
therefore enjoyed a right to sue pursuant to the ATS).
24
Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 187 (2002). Interestingly, these types of moral
contradictions have proved powerful in generating international criminal institutions, too.
A favorite, I call the Geneva Absurdity, was instrumental in the “fight against impunity,”
which played such an important role in the rise of modern international criminal justice.
My telling of the Geneva Absurdity goes: if you kill a single person, you go to prison; if
you kill ten people, you go to prison for the rest of your life, and in some places you are
subject to the death penalty; but if you murder 10,000 innocent people, you are invited to
Geneva for peace talks.
25
Aside from seeming overly grandiose, some might argue that the discovery metaphor
arrogates to so-called “norm entrepreneurs” an influence they do not deserve, and begs
the question whether this is the best way of regulating global corporate malfeasance. See
e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887–917 (1998) (offering an assessment of the role of norm
entrepreneurs in international relations); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000) (developing a theory of global business regulation to
respond to globalization, drawing on case studies from a wide variety of sectors);
Nonetheless, on balance, I’m comfortable with including the metaphor here, since: (a) as
an empirical observation, these fields do appear to emerge as a result of “discoveries”
that produce Kuhnian paradigm shifts. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
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Strangely, this “discovery” metaphor runs deeper still; corporate
responsibility for international crimes also depends on an American legal
innovation of a different sort. By 1909, the industrial revolution had
produced a swathe of new businesses, massive urbanization, and new
means of producing harm within and beyond the workplace. How would
systems of justice adjust to the rise of big business when extant laws
seemed ill equipped to deal with the might of oil barons, automotive
giants, and railroad companies at a time before the emergence of
regulatory agencies?26 In another mirroring of the ATS process and the
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd edition ed. 1970); (b) international criminal justice as a
field has often involved these types of discoveries in far more problematic settings (think
war crimes in non-international armed conflicts). On this topic, see Allison Marston
Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast the
Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2006) (discussing judicial creativity in international
criminal justice, with surprisingly little mention of the problem of retroactive criminal
liability.) The “discovery” of corporate criminal liability for international crimes in
national courts does not suffer from this problem; (c) In many parts of the world,
theorists of national criminal law also celebrate “discoveries”. See e.g., Markus D.
Dubber, The Promise of German Criminal Law: A Science of Crime and Punishment, 6
GERMAN L. J. 1049–1071, 1061 (2005) (“[d]octrines of criminal law [...] are not simply
developed, or refined, or adapted, they are ‘discovered.’ The history of German criminal
law theory is a history of these discoveries.”); (d) it was certainly not I who made the
initial “discovery” about corporate criminal responsibility for international crimes in
national law, so my ability to trumpet the find is nil. To the best of my knowledge, Diane
Amann was among the first to discuss this possibility, but without doubt, it was Anita
Ramasastry, Robert Thompson and Mark Taylor who’s ground-breaking comparative
work revealed the full extent of the opportunity. See Diane Marie Amann, Capital
Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for Gross Violations of Human Rights, 24
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327 (2000); RAMASASTRY, ANITA & THOMPSON,
ROBERT C, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR
LIABILITY
FOR
GRAVE
BREACHES
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
(2006),
www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf (surveying 16 legal systems to confirm that corporate
criminal responsibility for international crimes is available in many); See also, Robert C
Thompson, Anita Ramasastry & Mark B Taylor, Translating UNOCAL: The Expanding
Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 841 (2008). Of course, identifying the framework and employing it are two
very different things. But for the ability of Jim Goldston at the Open Society Justice
Initiative to recognize the significance of the “discovery” and Ken Hurwitz to tireless
make this happen, these insights would remain purely academic; (e) the discovery is very
helpful in moving this discourse away from the unhealthy fixation on the failure to
include corporate criminal liability in the ICC Statute, which produced overly pessimistic
visions of avenues for accountability already on offer; and (f) as a normative matter, the
purpose of this piece (and my other work on this topic) is very much to engage with the
conceptual merits of this “discovery”, which I do not take for granted.
26
V. S Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1477 (1995). For a history of corporate criminal liability in the United States, see
Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an

12

2014]

THE TURN TO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

turn to corporate criminal liability for international crimes today, the
American answer at the turn of the 20th century was innovative, pragmatic,
and more than slightly bizarre—prosecutors began charging companies
with crimes. Thus, in a further act of historical parallelism with the
contemporary, Celia Wells explains that corporate criminal liability was
initially “discovered.”27 And yet, in sharp contrast with Kiobel more than
a hundred years later, when the curious practice of charging corporations
with crimes reached the steps of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justices
unanimously endorsed it.28
Like the ATS, corporate criminal liability developed in the United
States in order to avoid egregious gaps in accountability. As Vikramaditya
Khanna has convincingly observed, it was the perception that corporate
criminal liability was “the only available option”29 that led to a gradual
acceptance of the novel practice. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court
itself, annulling the then growing incidence of corporate prosecutions
“would virtually take away the only means of effectually . . . correcting
the abuses aimed at.”30 Looking back at this historical “discovery” after
Kiobel, one is struck by a sense of bittersweet irony—the same blend of
legal entrepreneurialism and aversion to corporate impunity that carried
the day in the Supreme Court a century ago fell on deaf ears in Kiobel. So
the question immediately poses itself: could coupling their earlier
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 393 (1982). On the theoretical history of corporate
accountability, see MICHAEL BLOWFIELD & ALAN MURRAY, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 40–70 (2008).
27
CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 25 (2001) (in
discussing corporate criminal liability, Wells draws on Edwin Sutherland’s
groundbreaking work in white-collar crime, to poignantly observe that “[t]he fact that
white-collar crime had to be ‘discovered’ is sufficient to remind us that our notions of
crime and criminals derive not from definitions but from constructions of everyday
behaviour.”) Of course, there are ways of recasting this development in more pejorative
terms. Gerhard Mueller, for instance, famously compared corporate criminal liability to a
weed: “[n]obody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.” Gerhard
O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code
Position on Corporate Liability, 19 U. PITT. L REV. 21, 21 (1957). Still, in this respect
too, the comparisons with ATS litigation and the rise of corporate criminal liability for
international crimes are striking.
28
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co, v. United States 212 U.S. 481, 29
S.Ct 304, 53 L.Ed. 613 (1909). The issue is still the subject of considerable debate in the
United States. See John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009). For a critique of all
sides of this debate for failing to take into account the realities of corporate responsibility
for international crimes, see James G. Stewart, A Pragmatic Critique of Corporate
Criminal Theory, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 261 (2013).
29
Khanna, supra note 26, at 1486.
30
New York Central, supra note 28, at 496.
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enthusiasm for corporate criminal liability with the international law
governing international crimes à la Argor-Heraeus succeed where the ATS
did not?
At first blush, one is tempted to answer in the affirmative by stepping
away from the points of commonality between the two systems; despite
the great overlap, dissimilarities are important, and tend to account for
many of the core difficulties that plagued the ATS process. For one
reason, many more states are able to hear criminal cases against
corporations and their representatives for violations of ICL. Over the past
two decades, the originally American notion that corporate entities are
people for the purposes of criminal law has spread like contagion across
much of the planet, 31 for reasons that are largely indistinguishable from
those that first inspired the practice at home—impunity is inimical to basic
intuitions about justice. In 1988, for example, the Council of Europe
called on member states to embrace corporate criminal responsibility on
the grounds that individual criminal liability of corporate officers left a
regulatory gap that corporate criminal responsibility could fill.32 The
Swiss law on corporate criminal liability that forms the basis of the case
against Argor-Heraeus is, to bask in the irony a while longer, a direct
product of that call for Continental systems to (effectively) Americanize
this aspect of their criminal codes.33
31

WENDY DE BONDT, GERT VERMEULEN & CHARLOTTE RYCKMAN, LIABILITY OF LEGAL
PERSONS FOR OFFENCES IN THE EU 22–23 (2012) (stating that corporate criminal liability
did not come to European countries until 1976 in the Netherlands. Most countries
adopted in in the early 1990’s, but many like Spain and the Czech Republic have only
passed legislation codifying corporate criminal liability in the past year or so). See also,
JAMES GOBERT & ANA-MARIA PASCAL, EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2011) (setting out country reports on corporate criminal liability in
sixteen European jurisdictions). For a slightly dated survey of corporate criminal liability
within and beyond Europe, see HANS DE DOELDER & KLAUS TIEDEMANN, CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS (1996).
32
See Council of Europe, Recommendation no. R (88) 18 of the Committee of Ministers
to Member States Concerning Liability of Enterprises Having Legal Personality for
Offences Committed in the Exercise of Their Activities (adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on 20 October 1988 at the 420th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
According to Beth Stephens, the Inter-American Juridical Committee has issued a similar
call. Stephens, Beth, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 45–90, 107 (2002) (citing Inter-American Juridical
Committee, Inter-American Model Legislation on Illicit Enrichment and Transnational
Bribery, OENSer.Q CJI/doc.70/98 rev. 2, adopted Aug. 22, 1998).
33
It was not until 2003 that the Swiss finally succumbed to the trend the US Supreme
Court played a crucial role in beginning almost a century earlier. See Bertrand Perrin, La
responsabilité pénale de l’entreprise en droit Suisse, in CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 193, 198 (2011) (“[J]us’quà l’entrée
en vigeur, le 1er octobre 2003, de l’article 100quater CPS, prédécesseur de l’actuel article
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Little wonder, then, that John Ruggie, the former Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations, has described international criminal law as
“[b]y far the most consequential legal development” in the field of
business and human rights.34 In what follows, I substantiate this
contention by arguing that, despite its own set of shortcomings, ICL
enjoys distinct competitive advantages over its civil counterpart in core
areas.
In particular, I argue that reframing ATS cases as instances of
international crimes may overcome many of the principal challenges the
ATS process faced, even at its height. Some of these hurdles were about
doctrinal fit (viz. the extent to which the ATS “hook” successfully allowed
for corporate liability for violations of international law and what the
concept of complicity would entail once transposed into ATS cases),
whereas others entailed normative criticisms of the efficacy, utility or
propriety of allowing ATS suits against corporations to proceed in the
world as we find it. On both levels, I contend that the more recent
“discovery” of a role for international criminal law offers a smoother way
through. At the conceptual level, my ambition is to plot some of the
constitutive relations involved in marrying corporate criminal liability and
international law, inviting fresh scholarly treatment of the strengths and
weaknesses of this newly betrothed couple; debate that is not colored by
expectations specific to the ATS or the scholarly fields that traditionally
housed it.
102 CPS, l’ordre juridique suisse considérait que les personnes morale n’avaient pas la
capacité d’agir de manière coupable et devaient par conséquent échapper aux sanctions
pénales (‘societas delinquere non potest’)”). For one of the leading commentaries, see
MICHEL DUPUIS, BERNARD GELLER & GILLES MONNIER, CP: CODE PÉNAL  : PETIT
COMMENTAIRE 561 (2012).
34
John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 830 (2007); There is also a burgeoning literature exploring this
field, which emanates from scholars throughout the world. See Joanna Kyriakakis,
Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC Statute: The Comparative Law Challenge, 56
NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 333–366 (2009); DESISLAVA
STOITCHKOVA, TOWARDS CORPORATE LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2010); Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International
Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43–77 (2013); Andrew
Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations
and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 899–926 (2008); Michael J. Kelly,
Grafting the Command Responsibility Doctrine onto Corporate Criminal Liability for
Atrocities, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 671 (2010); Grietje Baars, LAW(YERS) CONGEALING
CAPITALISM: ON THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF RESTRAINING BUSINESS IN CONFLICT THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
LAW
(2012),
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1348306/1/1348306.pdf (last visited Jul 12, 2014).
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In Part I, I address complicity. I start by showing how this doctrine
unduly eclipsed alternative “modes of liability,” many of which implicate
corporate malfeasance in broader terms. Even with respect to complicity, I
show how both sides to the protracted debate about this doctrine within
the ATS process missed important nuances in the criminal law, which
were more permissive of these claims than either side presumed.
Specifically, scholars and advocates focused on whether the mental
element for complicity was “knowledge” or “purpose,” appealing to
different sources of law to ground their preference one way or the other.
While that debate made sense if one took some of the language of
international courts and tribunals at face value, a closer holistic inspection
of these standards as applied within criminal trials reveals that both sides
to the ATS debate were overly circumspect. More broadly, the debate
about the scope of complicity in ATS suits often sought to assign
complicity a single status in international law, overlooking the fact that
many national courts (including those in Switzerland) apply an entirely
different standard to that applicable in ATS litigation. Given this doctrinal
pluralism, these new criminal trials demand a normative critique of
complicity as a matter of moral philosophy, which was seldom
forthcoming within debates about the economic or political desirability of
the ATS.
In Part II, I show how corporations can be prosecuted for international
crimes in domestic courts in ways that transcend major stumbling blocks
that impeded ATS litigation. As I will document, the question of corporate
responsibility under the ATS regime was initially assumed. When it later
became highly contested, the question was frequently pitched at the level
of public international law—can corporations commit international crimes
as a matter of the laws of nations?35 While a certain cohort of ATS
advocates always doubted the necessity of that inquiry, the answer to it is
made clear by legislation in the adjacent criminal context. In what follows,
I confirm how the case against Argor-Heraeus (and the many other
companies that could be tried similarly) is grounded in what Harold Koh
calls transnational law,36 bypassing the rarefied debate about corporate
personality in public international law generally and customary
international law in particular. In essence, international law governing
international crimes is “downloaded” into national criminal law, then
partners with domestic notions of corporate criminal liability. This, again,

35

See infra notes 61–64.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV., 745
(2006).

36
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is quite different from the methodologies that came before within the
ATS, when the issue polarized courts and scholars alike.
In Part III, I explore the upsides of handing these cases to state
prosecutors instead of relying on the private right to sue. The ability of
global citizenry to initiate proceedings against powerful multinational
enterprises before US courts was a key advantage of the ATS as initially
conceived. Without doubt, the loss of this right to sue is a tremendous
blow, especially in a world where corporate accountability for violations
of international law is exceptionally rare. At the same time, there are
conceptual, legal and pragmatic reasons why framing these sorts of
allegations within corporate criminal liability might at least mitigate
Kiobel’s impact, and in a best case scenario, improve the likelihood of
meaningful accountability. In this Part, I point to a range of these upsides,
starting with the idea that criminal responsibility may better respond to
crimes of this magnitude, culminating in the recognition that it is highly
improbable that Argor-Heraeus could be heard within the ATS
framework. I argue that a criminal framing has its advantages relative to
the civil alternative, which we should now explore with greater scholarly
zeal.
Finally, in Part IV, I point to the rationales for punishing corporations
and their representatives for violating the strictures of international
criminal law, which transcend the compliance narrative that presently
pervades the business and human rights discourse in which the ATS
frequently appeared. Debates about the propriety of the ATS process were
extensive and important, but they tended to take place within the fields of
international law and relations exclusively. Quite understandably, that
disciplinarian perspective made corporate “compliance” with human
rights the metric by which all initiatives would be judged.37 Here, I argue
that while very helpful, that discourse has also left out something an
approach grounded in criminal law will insist upon, namely, guilt. In that
vein, I show how many of the intuitions around the need for accountability
within the business and human rights movement probably constitute what
one leading criminal theorist calls “closet retributivism.”38 When
reconsidered in a retributive light, criminal trials not only offer vehicles
for vindicating these desires, they also provide convincing normative
responses to criticisms leveled at the ATS process.
Let me qualify the foregoing, to avoid misunderstandings from the
outset. This turn to criminal responsibility does not mean that all other
regulatory options are off the table; it just adds a new point to debates that
37
38

See infra notes 111-112.
Michael S. Moore, Closet Retributivism, in PLACING BLAME 83–103 (2010).
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are likely to continue in perpetuity. Like others, I am sensitive to the need
for initiatives that address corporate responsibility for human rights
violations at a number of intervals, including voluntary projects like the
Kimberley Process, financial regulation as in the Dodd-Frank Act, and
processes bent on acculturation, of which the UN Global Compact is a
prime exemplar.39 In the same breath, the retributive intuition helps ensure
that for all its obvious benefits, Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”)
does not inhibit more principled forms of accountability. All of these
points, which passed underneath the radar during the primacy of ATS
litigation, are brought front and center by the “discovery” of a new
criminal phase in corporate accountability for violations of international
law.
There are several ways to construct my critical comparison between
ATS litigation and the new role assigned international criminal law, some
more provocative than others. Drawing on David Kennedy, we might
inquire whether the ATS might “on balance, and acknowledging its
enormous achievement, be more part of the problem in today’s world than
part of the solution.”40 Put differently, if activists, human rights groups
39

There is much positive to be said about each of these regulatory initiatives. See
FRANZISKA BIERI, FROM BLOOD DIAMONDS TO THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS (2010)
(arguing that the Kimberley Process has reduced trade in conflict diamonds from 15%
during the 1990s to just 1% today); More generally, see Paul Collier, Laws and Codes for
the Resource Curse, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 9, 22–24 (2008) (assessing the
extent to which voluntary codes like the Kimberley Process can be useful in conveying
information and realigning incentives within the natural resource sector); On the DoddFranks Act, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J.
INT’L L. 97, 101–102 (2013) (arguing that securities law is an innovative strategy that
can promote corporate accountability, if framed appropriately); Georg Kell & John
Gerard Ruggie, Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: The Case of the “Global
Compact,” 8 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 101–120 (1999) (offering arguments for
the UN Global Compact that ultimately carried the day). Of course, whether these
initiatives are optimal as a global regulatory scheme for the protection of human rights is
debatable. On this score, see Surya Deva’s powerful criticism in Chapter 4 Existing
Regulatory Initiatives: An evaluation of (In)adequacy in SURYA DEVA, REGULATING
CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: HUMANIZING BUSINESS 65–118 (2012).
40
David Kennedy, International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 101, 101 (2002). Samuel Moyn tacitly suggests that this criticism is
true of the ATS, when he laments how it “marginalized other options.” Samuel Moyn,
Why the Court Was Right About the Alien Tort Statute, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May 2, 2013,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139359/samuel-moyn/why-the-court-was-rightabout-the-alien-tort-statute (last visited Jun 15, 2013). I am sympathetic to the intuition,
although moving it from rhetorical conjecture to demonstrable truth strikes me as quite
challenging. Also, as I mention further below, I see no reason why accountability need
necessarily crowd out distributive justice projects (even if it has in the past), and
therefore disagree with Moyn that we should only become “less centered on courts, less
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and philanthropic organizations have to choose a single strategy in which
to spend limited resources, energy and attention combatting corporate
violations of international law globally, we might ask whether they would
be wise to invest in corporate criminal liability ahead of ATS litigation.
But why insist on just a single strategy? Personally, I do not think the ATS
and ICL are necessarily mutually exclusive, that they inexorably crowd
out attempts at addressing root causes of egregious human rights
violations or unavoidably marginalize wider distributive justice initiatives
some, like Samuel Moyn, appear to prioritize.41 With care, consciousness

rushed for a quick fix, less concerned with spectacular wrongs to individuals and more
with structural evils, and less disconnected from social movements abroad.” Id. Finally, I
fear that placing the emphasis on “social movements abroad” could inappropriately water
down moral responsibilities. To overly-embellish somewhat, Peter Singer uses a person
walking past a baby drowning in a puddle as a metaphor for assessing our moral
responsibilities to the global poor, but Thomas Pogge chastises him for setting the
problem up as one of omission—in truth, we are actively participating in the deaths of
very many poor people through policies developed and implemented by our institutions.
See THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 123 (2008). If this is
true, placing too much of the onus on “social movements abroad” risks asking foreign
victims to find solutions for our moral transgressions; taken to an extreme, it asks the
baby to find its own authentic/indigenous way out of the puddle we have placed her in.
41
To my mind, there is something of a tradition among some of the most gifted scholars
to claim mutual exclusivity between accountability and distributive justice, without
adequately establishing why the characteristics of one have a causal effect that precludes
the other. For examples from two of the most brilliant scholars, see SAMUEL MOYN,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USES OF HISTORY [kindle location 1028] (2014) (arguing that
the rise of international criminal justice came at the expense of arguments for greater
distributive justice globally). More intensely, see also Baars, supra note 34 (effectively
arguing that Marxism and ICL are mutually exclusive). Both arguments are exceptionally
eloquent, but I suspect that much more would be required as proof to substantiate the
mutual exclusivity claimed. Analytically, if Phenomenon A exists and Phenomenon B
does not, it does not necessarily follow that Phenomena A and B are mutually exclusive;
there could be myriad causal explanations, other than the existence of Phenomenon A,
for the failure of Phenomenon B to materialize. In terms of the responsibility of ICL
lawyers in particular, if there is a causal relationship between the corporate accountability
agenda for violations of ICL and the global polity’s failure to enact a Marxist world
government, that contribution is surely causally miniscule next to the innumerable other
more potent influences. Thus, I worry that entertaining a theory of complicity of this
breadth (in essence, lawyers calling for accountability for violations of ICL by
corporations are complicit in capitalist imperialism) would make us all responsible for
everything. Exorbitant visions of responsibility like this are often attractive when faced
with the daunting extent of global injustice, but they dilute moral responsibility to
vanishing point, meaning that perversely, no one is really responsible for anything. All
this said, these criticisms are enormously helpful in pointing to the dangers of a blinkered
approach bent on accountability à tout prix, and exemplars of the intellectual debate I
hope these developments spark.
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and a modicum of co-ordination, it is at least conceivable that these things
might peaceably co-exist or even operate synergistically.
Consequently, in what follows, I prefer to isolate the upsides of
corporate criminal liability for international crimes relative to ATS
litigation, in the hope of identifying a form of accountability that will
operate in a more cohesive and principled fashion with the ATS and other
mechanisms moving forward. This, in other words, is a comparison not
critique of the ATS, which I view as hugely important. By plotting the
normative contours of the new global transnational regime the ArgorHeraeus case arises within, I invite fresh interdisciplinary scholarship,
both supportive and critical, about this emergent new alternative
paradigm.
Of necessity, I leave much out. I set aside, for instance, that
international crimes generally enjoy extraterritorial application,42 thereby
solving the problem that ultimately proved ATS’s undoing in Kiobel.
Likewise, I will not discuss how (like the ATS) international criminal law
provides a binding legal framework that contrasts with the many voluntary
initiatives predicated on corporations magnanimously professing
allegiance to basic international standards.43 Finally, I do not repeat my
earlier work offering a qualified defense of corporate criminal liability in
abstract terms,44 except to reiterate that I view it as defensible under
certain conditions and that it is formally intended to go hand in hand with
individual criminal liability of corporate officers (instead of shielding

42

ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT:
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW - A SURVEY OF SIXTEEN COUNTRIES (2006) (finding that 11 of 16
states surveyed have jurisdiction over international crimes perpetrated by their nationals
extraterritorially); Robert C Thompson, Anita Ramasastry & Mark B Taylor, Translating
UNOCAL: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in
International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841, 854–858 (2008) (discussing
extraterritorial jurisdiction for international crimes in a number of countries under the
heading “The Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Laws Creates a Universal Web of
Liability”).
43
JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL ETHICS SERIES) 68–78 (2013) (outlining and
assessing the value of extant voluntary initiatives). See also Scott Pegg, An Emerging
Market for the New Millenium: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, in
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 21–25 (Jedrzej George Frynas &
Scott Pegg eds., 2003) (discussing voluntary approaches and self regulation as bases for
corporate compliance with human rights).
44
See Stewart, supra note 28, at 276-281. For an important recent philosophical defense
of corporate moral agency, see also, CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY:
THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 155–163 (2011).
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businesspeople from individual accountability).45 In fact, with respect to
the relationship with businesspeople as individuals, some jurisdictions
only allow corporate criminal liability when cases against corporate
officers cannot be mounted, reaffirming that like the ATS, this legal
device is sometimes built as a kind of safety net to ensure that impunity
does not prevail. Ironically again, this is the position in Switzerland,
where Argor-Heraeus is seated.46
With these caveats in mind, we move to the first area where ICL proper
opens up new channels through topics that slowed the ATS’s passage.
45

Treating individual and corporate criminal liability as mutually exclusive (rather than
operating hand in hand) is conceptually dangerous. Only prosecuting business
representatives as individuals provides corporations with incentives to scapegoat their
employees, whereas a unique focus on the corporation allows individuals to avoid their
own moral responsibilities by pointing to the surrounding corporate structure. See, in this
regard, BRENT FISSE AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, 36 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), CELIA WELLS,
CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 52 (Oxford, 2nd ed., 2001). Out of a
concern for this danger, a number of criminal codes emphasize that one form of
responsibility should not defeat the other. See generally, Recommendation, Council of
Europe Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Liability of Enterprises
Having Legal Personality for Offences Committed in Exercise of the Activities, ¶ 5
(“[t]he imposition of liability on the enterprise should not exonerate from liability a
natural person implicated in the offence.”) For specific examples of criminal legislation
reflecting this principle, see Austria, Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesestz, § 3(4) (stating
that both a natural person and the legal person may be held responsible for the same
offense); Code Pénal Francais (stating that the criminal responsibility of the corporate
entity does not exclude that of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices to the
same act.”); Gérard Couturier, Répartition des responsabilités entre personnes morales et
personnes physiques, 111 REVUE DES SOCIÉTÉS 307 (Dalloz, April 1993). Even the draft
ICC Statute, which contemplated a notion of corporate criminal liability for international
crimes that was not retained in the final version of the Statute contained text indicating
that “[t]he criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal
responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same
crimes.” See Article 17(6) of the Draft Statute contained within Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 16 March-3 April 1998, Report
of the Inter-Sessional Meeting From 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands,
A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 4 February 1998, at 53.
46
In Switzerland, corporate criminal liability only arises where a crime or misdemeanor
perpetrated during commercial activities cannot be imputed to a particular business
representative. Article 102(1) of the Swiss Penal Code states that “[a] crime or a
misdemeanor that is committed in a corporation in the exercise of commercial activities
confirming to its objects is imputed to the corporation if it cannot be imputed to an
identified physical person by reason of the lack of organization of the corporation…”
Article 121-3. This approach to corporate criminal liability highlights the doctrine’s role
as a backstop that prevents against impunity. This position undermines the thesis that
corporate criminal liability exists as a means of shielding individuals within businesses;
on the contrary, it assumes they have well shielded themselves.
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II. BEYOND THE ATS’S COMPLICITY DEBATE
Complicity, or aiding and abetting, is responsibility for helping.47 The
concept was a favorite device for attributing responsibility to corporations
under the ATS scheme. From Talisman to Khulumani, a range of cases
alleged that corporations were complicit in the violations of the laws of
nations that security forces, governmental agents or armed factions carried
out.48 Intriguingly, Appellate courts split as to whether a “purpose”
standard similar to that contained in the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) Statute, or a “knowledge” standard applied by other international
courts and tribunals appropriately reflected the international law ATS
cases were compelled to apply.49 Scholars either sided with the knowledge
camp,50 or lamented the apparently insurmountable methodological
47

Out of frustration with the imprecise, archaic and duplicative terms complicity, aiding
and abetting, accomplice liability, and accessorial liability, at least one leading criminal
theorist has argued that we should simply describe this form of liability as “helping”. See
Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
25, 9 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he one who pulls the trigger kills; the supplier of the
weapon helps.”); As far as technical descriptions of accomplice liability go, in my
opinion, Alan Sykes has offered the most concise when he states that “[a]n aider and
abettor commits an act that contributes in some way to an ultimate harm but is not, by
itself, sufficient to cause the harm.” Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for
Extraterritorial Torts under the Alien Tort Statute and beyond: An Economic Analysis,
100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2188 (2011). Some would say that this definition is deficient since it
fails to demarcate complicity from co-perpetration. On that distinction, see GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 638–39 and 659–69 (1978). For myself, I view
the distinction as normatively unimportant as a matter of substantive criminal law. See
James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN.
J. INT’L. L. 165–219, 206–207 (2012) Therefore, I view Syke’s definition as complete.
48
For helpful compilations of this case-law, see BETH STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 264–274 (2008); MICHAEL
KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 259–275
(2009).
49
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2nd Cir. 2009)
(finding that purposes and not knowledge is required for aiding and abetting with the
ATS context, and interpreting purpose as going to the consummated offence). For cases
applying a “knowledge” standard, see In Re South African Apartheid Litigation 617 F.
Supp. 2d 288 (2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
50
Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
61 (2008); Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations:
Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. UNIV. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2007); David Scheffer &
Caroline Kaeb, Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability
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ambiguity the whole exercise entailed.51 For understandable reasons, these
debates about the reach of civil liability did not engage with adjacent
questions in the criminal law, including: (a) complicity’s relationship with
other forms of blame attribution; (b) its meaning in comparative criminal
law;52 or (c) broader normative debates about the shape it should take as a
moral principle.53 In what follows, I suggest that Argor-Heraeus is a key
moment for the notion of corporate complicity, precisely because it lifts
these new questions to the surface.
A.

On Complicity’s Eclipsing Effect

Before we begin discussing complicity, it is worth emphasizing that
aiding and abetting is not the sole basis for attributing criminal
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance
Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 334–357 (2011).
51
Ingrid Wuerth, Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1945 (2009) (“Standing alone, neither domestic nor
international law is a satisfactory source for aiding and abetting norms; it is little wonder
that courts devoted substantial resources in trying to answer this question, only to
generate a variety of opinions, none of them fully convincing.”).
52
For my own overview of the various competing theories of complicity from the
perspective of comparative criminal theory not international criminal law, see James G.
Stewart, Complicity, in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (forthcoming 2014)
(Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds.).
53
I should disclose, at the outset, that I have defended a unitary theory of perpetration as
a global theory of accomplice liability for international crimes, regardless of whether
these cases are brought in international or domestic courts. See Stewart, supra note 48.
For informative criticisms of this theory and my responses to them, see Darryl Robinson,
LJIL Symposium: Darryl Robinson Comments On James Stewart’s “End Of Modes Of
Liability,” OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/21/ljil-robinsoncomments-on-stewart/ (last visited Aug 14, 2014); James G. Stewart, LJIL Symposium:
James Stewart responds to Darryl Robinson, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/21/ljil-stewart-responds-to-robinson/ (last visited Aug 14,
2014); Jens Ohlin, LJIL Symposium: Names, Labels, and Roses, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 21,
2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/23/ljil-names-labels-and-roses/ (last visited Aug 14,
2014); James G. Stewart, LJIL Symposium: James Stewart Responds to Jens Ohlin,
OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/23/ljil-stewart-responds-toohlin/ (last visited Aug 14, 2014); Thomas Weigend, LJIL Symposium: Thomas
Weigend comments on James Stewart’s “The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for
International
Crimes”,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Mar.
23,
2012),
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/22/ljil-weigend-comments/ (last visited Aug 14, 2014);
James G. Stewart, LJIL Symposium: James Stewart Responds to Thomas Weigend
OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/22/ljil-stewart-responds-toweigend/ (last visited Aug 14, 2014).
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responsibility to commercial actors in war. While complicity is far and
away the dominant point of focus in the ATS discourse, as well as in the
field of business and human rights writ large,54 limiting this debate to
complicity inappropriately sells the reach of international criminal law
short.
In truth, international criminal law has a long history of struggling with
a full array of “modes of liability,” from superior responsibility to joint
criminal enterprise and far beyond.55 Although there was some uptake of
these different forms of liability in ATS litigation,56 numerically speaking,
these instances were dwarfed by the much larger presence of aiding and
abetting liability in corporate cases. Similarly, while scholars sometimes
gestured towards these wider doctrinal possibilities,57 their sage advice
often did not receive the attention it deserved, drowned out as it were by
the vociferous interest in complicity as a basis for assigning responsibility
to corporate actors.58 By contrast, considering the responsibility of
commercial actors (corporations and their officers) in ICL will require a
far more involved understanding of the full spectrum of standards on
offer, instead of overemphasizing just one limited piece of the far larger
puzzle.
In some commercial sectors, this need to bring in other forms of
responsibility from ICL is already acknowledged in international law
54

See International Commission of Jurists, CORPORATE COMPLICITY & LEGAL
ACCOUNTABILITY, (2008) Vols I, II and III. Available online at: http://goo.gl/8Utbd.
55
The literature treating the subject is extensive, complex and sophisticated. See, in
particular, ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY (2009);
NEHA JAIN, PERPETRATORS AND ACCESSORIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
INDIVIDUAL MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTIVE CRIMES (2014); Jens David
Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69 –90 (2007); Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command
Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251 (2008);
Mirjan Damas̆ ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455–
496 (2001).
56
For helpful summaries of the handful of ATS cases that have considered command
responsibility (a.k.a. superior responsibility), conspiracy and joint criminal enterprise, see
PETER HENNER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 210–225 (2009); BETH
STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
257–264 and 274–276 (2008).
57
Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of
Accomplice Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 39
(2005) (discussing four alternative forms of accountability, but not superior
responsibility).
58
In recent years, this doctrinal heterogeneity has only increased through the mass
invocation of German notions of responsibility at the ICC, such as co-perpetration and
commission through an organization.
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circles, even if the relationship is yet to be tested in practice. In September
2008, a group of seventeen States (including the United States, the United
Kingdom, China, and South Africa) formally agreed that the ICL concept
of superior responsibility has a potential role in assigning responsibility
for international crimes to company directors and those contracting private
military companies.59 Again, somewhat ironically, this aspect of the turn
to ICL is also counterfactually dependent on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
concern for impunity—it was not until it approved of superior
responsibility in the trial of the Japanese General Yamashita after WWII60
that the doctrine began its rise to prominence within international criminal
justice.61 History aside, the potential significance of superior responsibility
for the market in military services reveals just one example of the dangers
of treating corporate responsibility as coterminous with complicity;
systemically speaking, the fallacy exonerates commercial actors of what
normally constitutes egregious wrongdoing.
Moreover, beyond just forms of participation, what about the definition
of international crimes themselves? These questions also seem to have
escaped close scrutiny in constellating the relationship between
commerce, atrocity and ICL. For instance, a number of excellent scholars
have argued that “corporations might in theory commit war crimes or
crimes against humanity, but as a practical matter, history does not

59

According to the Montreux Document organized by the ICRC and Swiss government,
then signed by 17 other nations, “Superiors of PMSC personnel, such as: a) governmental
officials, whether they are military commanders or civilian superiors, or b) directors or
managers of PMSCs, may be liable for crimes under international law committed by
PMSC personnel under their effective authority and control, as a result of their failure to
properly exercise control over them, in accordance with the rules of international law.
Superior responsibility is not engaged solely by virtue of a contract.” See The Montreux
Document on Private Military and Security Companies, 17 September 2008, available
online at http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html
(visited 3 January 2010). Since the date of signing a total of 50 states have endorsed the
document.
See
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (visited May
22 2014).
60
In Re: Yamashita 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946). Richard Lael has written an excellent history
of the controversial case, see RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR
CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1982).
61
As Kevin Heller has noted, courts convened after WWII “simply cited Yamashita,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1949, for the existence of the mode of
participation.” KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 262–263 (2011).
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suggest this is a prevalent practice.”62 This claim is probably a fair
empirical observation for many international crimes, but it is not an
invariable truth. In fact, a clearer understanding of the precise meaning of
some international offenses points to the diametrically opposite
conclusion—many corporate actors commit the war crime of pillage in
modern resource wars,63 and they frequently do so as direct perpetrators
not accomplices. A fulsome analysis of the doctrine governing pillage
indicates the term “appropriate” in the definition of the crime incorporates
those who harvest resources directly from the ground and those who
acquire them from an intermediary.64 As such, the war crime encapsulates
an entire supply chain, without resort to complicity. On both scores, these
findings reinforce the idea that complicity is merely one part of a larger
story about ICL in corporate contexts that is yet to be fully told.
B.

Doctrinal Infidelity

With the caveat that complicity does not exhaust the full extent of
corporate exposure to liability for international crimes, let us consider how
debates about complicity in ATS litigation squared with doctrinal
understandings of the same concept in ICL. As I suggest at the outset,
courts and scholars were divided between purpose and knowledge as
requisite mental elements for accomplice liability throughout much of the
ATS’s history; indeed, the debate was a core point of contention
constituting the field.65 Once considered as a matter of ICL pure, however,
neither set of arguments appear entirely faithful to the true applied
62

Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 495 (2001) (emphasis added). See also William Schabas, War Economies,
Economic Acts, and International Criminal Law, in PROFITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING
THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR 60 (Ballenstine et al., eds., 2005) [hereinafter
PROFITING FROM PEACE] (arguing that “[g]enerally, though, the role of economic actors
is more indirect. For example, while it is widely agreed that trade in diamonds helped to
fuel conflict in places like Sierra Leone, unless it can be established that diamond traders
were actually accomplices in the atrocities committed against civilians, there is little that
existing law can contribute.”)
63
PHILIPPE LE BILLON, WARS OF PLUNDER: CONFLICTS, PROFITS AND THE POLITICS OF
RESOURCES (2012); MICHAEL KLARE, RESOURCE WARS  : THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF
GLOBAL CONFLICT (2002).
64
STEWART, supra note 3, at 35–37 (showing how at least twenty-six WWII cases
involved received stolen property as a basis for pillage, and how the assimilation of theft
and receiving is not conceptually problematic, since the receiver also acquires property
without the consent of the true owner).
65
See infra notes 49 and 50.
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meaning of complicity internationally. In actual fact, both complicity
standards were more permissive of these suits against commercial actors
than most assumed, and third types exist that leave the door even further
ajar. An unintended consequence of the turn to criminal cases is that it
may provide an opportunity to refashion accomplice liability in ways that
are more faithful to its criminological meaning.
I begin with “purpose.” Within ATS litigation, this elevated standard
was often interpreted as demanding a volitional disposition by Talisman,
say, towards the violations of international law carried out by the
Sudanese armed forces alleged to have used their fuel, roads, and airstrips
to attack civilians.66 Before considering this position as a matter of
doctrine, note first how the purpose standard is something of an outlier in
comparative criminal terms: to the best of my knowledge, only the U.S,
Canada, Israel and the ICC mention “purpose” in their complicity
standards.67 This is highly significant if the interface between ICL and
commerce will take place in national criminal courts, which are free to
apply their own notions of aiding and abetting rather than those defined in
customary international law, which ATS litigation was frequently at pains
to decipher. For criminal liability, therefore, the purpose debate in ATS
caselaw and scholarship was always somewhat hors-sujet; the test exists
in a miniscule number of jurisdictions that could try these sorts of cases.
Nonetheless, even assuming that international standards of accomplice
liability apply, a closer reading of criminal law suggests a significantly
broader interpretation of the purpose standard than that adopted by most
participants in the ATS process.68 True, the U.S. Model Penal Code (from
whence the international purpose standard originates), states that “[a]
person is an accomplice . . . if with the purpose of facilitating the

66

Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
See infra notes 58-70. Immediately before this Article went to press, I realized that my
own country of citizenship, New Zealand, also stipulates that “[e]very one is a part to and
guilt of an offence who… (b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to
commit the offence” Crimes Act 1961, § 66(1) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, like
Canada, this language is interpreted as requiring only knowledge. See Mahana Makarini
Edmonds v. R. [2011] NZSC 159, para. 25 (“A party will be liable as an aider and abettor
only if he or she had knowledge of the essential matters constituting the offence.”)
(emphasis added).
68
Most assumed that “purpose” entailed a volitional commitment to the consummated
crime, but David Scheffer and others made astute arguments based on the negotiating
history of the ICC to suggest that purpose was really meant to be synonymous with
intention. Scheffer and Kaeb, supra note 50, at 351–353. In effect, this advocates for
interpreting purpose in the same fashions as New Zealand, Canada, Israel and the version
of the Model Penal Code discussed below.
67
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commission of the offence . . .”69 And yet, it goes on to insist in the very
next paragraph that “[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice
in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense.”70 Although this subsequent paragraph changes the meaning of
the purpose test entirely, it does not seem to have featured anywhere in the
ATS debates. Nonetheless, the missing provision’s impact is likely to be
significant, especially in the corporate world.
On the basis of this second overlooked component of the rule, leading
American scholars and the vast majority of state jurisdictions in America
consider that the purpose requirement goes only to the provision of the
assistance (Talisman must have wanted to provide armed groups with
access to its airfields), leaving the mental element in the crime with which
the accomplice is charged to determine the culpability requisite for the
attendant consequences (if recklessness suffices for crimes against
humanity, Talisman must only be reckless that offering the airfields will
lead to crimes against humanity).71 Leading scholars not only explain that
this meaning was intended during the negotiation of the MPC,72 a
comprehensive survey of American state jurisdictions confirms that 47 of
50 states either give “purpose” this meaning or abandon the term
entirely.73 In keeping with this trend, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
69

Model Penal Code Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), §
2.06(3)(a), at 296.
70
Id. § 2.06(4) (emphasis added).
71
I am grateful to participants at the San Diego workshop on the criminal theory of
complicity for pointing this out to me, especially Michael Moore and Mitchell Berman.
72
Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 217, n.51 (2000)
(“Arguably, section 2.06(4) [requires] that an accomplice purposefully assist or
encourage the principal’s act, while having whatever culpable mental state with respect
to the result that is required for liability as a principal”); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A.
Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and
Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, n.266 (1983) (discussing the negotiating history of the
MPC that supports this interpretation); Grace E. Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice
Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2169, 2178–2180 (1987).
73
John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American
Criminal Law, 60 S. C. L. REV. 237 (2008) (categorizing aiding and abetting standards in
the US into three broad categories, which include (a) specific intent standards, which
equate to a strong purpose standard; (b) “statutorily prescribed mental states”, which uses
the missing section 2.06(4) language to require whatever mental state is announced in the
crime charged to define the mental element required for accomplice liability; and (c)
“natural and probable consequences.” Most states fall within category (c), but only three
come with (a). The remainder are either category (b), or some variant that fall outside the
taxonomy).
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stipulated that “for purposes of aiding and abetting law, a person who
actively participates in a criminal scheme knowing its extent and character
intends that scheme’s commission.”73a
Foreign understandings of the “purpose” standard for complicity only
confirm that indeed, we all misread the term. Canadian criminal law
insists that “purpose…is essentially synonymous with ‘intention’ and does
not mean desire.”74 Likewise, Israel adopts precisely the alternative
interpretation of purpose that always escaped advocates in the ATS
context—like the MPC and the vast majority of states in America, Israeli
criminal law interprets its purpose standard as only going to the actus reus
of the assistance.75 There is, as a result, next to no example of complicity
in national criminal law that adopted a “purpose” standard like that
endorsed in some leading ATS cases. As such, the turn to corporate
criminal liability may offer the small number of jurisdictions that apply
purpose standards a chance to clarify the international confusion brought
about in their names.
Of course, this leaves the ICC Statute. Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC
Statute stipulates that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that
73a

Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (2014). In the same vein, the
majority later reports that “The law does not, nor should it, care whether he participates
with a happy heart or a sense of foreboding.” Admittedly, the reasoning required to
achieve this outcome is less than convincing. As Justice Alito observed in dissent, having
reviewed the history of the knowledge and purpose debates up until then, the majority
opinion confounds these two standards. Nonetheless, it is tremendously significant that,
in practice if not rhetoric, the resulting standard for complicity is knowledge.
74
The leading case on the proposition is R v. Hibbert [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 (“Parliament's
use of the term ‘purpose’ in s. 21(1)(b) should not be seen as incorporating the notion of
‘desire’ into the mental state for party liability, and that the word should instead be
understood as being essentially synonymous with ‘intention’”). For a summary of further
cases affirming that purpose does not equal desire in the law governing aiding and
abetting in Canada, see DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW: A TREATISE 664
(2011). If reducing purpose to intention seems strange, see Finnis’s explanation of how
most English jurisdictions extent intention downwards, whereas “Canadians select
‘purposely’ as the term to be artificially extended.” JOHN FINNIS, INTENTION AND
IDENTITY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 86 (2011).
75
Israel, for example, is one of the very few states that use purpose as a mental element
for complicity. Nonetheless, like the MPC and the vast majority of states in America, it
interprets it far more restrictively than those within the ATS process understood. See
Itzhak Kugler, Israel, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 352, 370
(Kevin Jon Heller & Markus Dubber eds.) (citing the Israeli Supreme Court case of CA.
320/99 Plonit v. State of Israel 55(3) PD 22 [1999] for the conclusion that “where the
aider only foresees the possibility of the commission of the principal offense, the aider
may be convicted if it is his or her desire that should the offense actually be committed,
his or her act will facilitate its commission.”).
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person: . . . [f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission.”76 Here,
the nuanced additional element of the MPC is sadly missing, and it is less
clear that the precision of national understandings of purpose will or
should influence the international hermeneutics. Admittedly, we
international scholars have always misread the MPC on complicity too,77
but the future of corporate responsibility for international crimes may
quickly correct this. All of the leading commentators on the ICC Statute
readily acknowledge that the ICC standard just copied from the MPC.78 It
follows that because the ICC “purpose” standard is “borrowed from the
US Model Penal Code, the Code’s test should be adopted.”79
Strangely, from the perspective of the criminal law, the competing
“knowledge” standard for complicity was probably undersold in ATS
litigation, too.80 Although most ad hoc ICL tribunals claim to be applying
knowledge as a mental element for complicity, it frequently dilutes into
recklessness in application. This is evident, for instance, from the habitual
inclusion within most international criminal judgments of the refrain that
“[i]f he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be
committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended
to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and an
abettor.”81 Clearly, awareness of a probability is constitutive of culpable
risk-taking, not knowledge. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the
numerous applications of this standard in practice corroborate the thesis
76

ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(c).
As I say, I am among those guilty of this misreading. See Stewart, supra note 48, at
196–199.
78
KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS
AND GENERAL PART 165–166 (2013) (acknowledging that the ICC’s use of the term
purpose “is borrowed from the Model Penal Code,” then interpreting this standard as
requiring “a volitional dimension, beyond mere knowledge.”); ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT,
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (2012) (describing
the ICC’s “purpose” standard as “akin to a purpose approach of mens reas and
reminiscent of the MPC standard and the approach in US federal law to complicity
liability”. She concludes that purpose derives from knowledge, is stricter than that
adopted in a number of national jurisdictions, and inconsistent with customary
international law).
79
SARAH FINNIN, ELEMENTS OF ACCESSORIAL MODES OF LIABILITY: ARTICLE 25(3)(B)
AND (C) OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 201 (2012).
80
For a more elaborate version of this argument, see Stewart, supra note 48, at 192–193.
81
Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (emphasis added). For references to other
case-law that also adopts this position, see Id. at 137.
77
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that recklessness is the most common test for complicity internationally.82
In this light, the knowledge camp in ATS litigation was also too
circumspect.
Finally, to complete this light speed survey of complicity's likely
incongruent application outside the ATS, third standards may very well
apply in cases involving corporate responsibility for international crimes if
Argor-Heraeus begins a trend. Take the Dutch case Van Anraat, where a
Dutch businessman was successfully prosecuted as an accomplice to
international crimes for selling chemical pre-cursors that Saddam Hussein
used to asphyxiate Iraqi Kurds.83 When faced with the question of whether
to defer to the purpose/knowledge debate that captivated ATS litigation or
simply to apply Dutch standards, courts in The Netherlands opted for the
latter course. In effect, this stance meant that the court applied what
continental lawyers call dolus eventualis, requiring simply that the
accomplice perceived the occurrence of the criminal result as a possible
consequence of their assistance and made peace with that possibility.84 If
ATS cases are transplanted into the many civil law jurisdictions that
entertain this concept (as corporate criminal responsibility will often
82

Id. at 192–193. The doublespeak (claiming knowledge but really requiring
recklessness) is certainly troubling, but recall that this interpretation is inspired by
national jurisdictions that do exactly the same. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 725-727 (2nd ed. 2010) (discussing the “natural and probable
consequence” rule in various American jurisdictions, which is very similar to that
adopted in international criminal justice); JACQUES-HENRI ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL
GÉNÉRAL 350 (6e éd. 2005) (setting out how an accomplice’s acts are unlawful if the
crime actually committed injures the same legal interest as that the accomplice
considered); Ashworth, supra note 99, at 415-420 (discussing English jurisprudence that
makes it adequate that the accomplice knows of the “type” of crime the perpetrator will
commit, concluding that this “introduces reckless knowledge as sufficient.”).
83
Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, May 9, 2007, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage,
2200050906-2, (Neth.). For leading commentary on this and other related Dutch cases,
see Harmen G. van der Wilt, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v.
Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat Case, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 239
(2006); Wim Huisman & Elies Van Sliedregt, Rogue Traders Dutch Businessmen,
International Crimes and Corporate Complicity, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 803 (2010);
Larissa van den Herik, The Difficulties of Exercising Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction: The Acquittal of a Dutch Businessman for Crimes Committed in Liberia, 9
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 211 (2009).
84
George Fletcher provides a typically clear English-language explanation of dolus
eventualis. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 445–448 (1978); To see
a summary of jurisdictions that allow for dolus eventualis, see JEAN PRADEL, DROIT
PÉNAL COMPARÉ 38 (3rd ed. 2008). On a conceptual plane, Greg Taylor has offered an
outstanding criticism of the assimilation of dolus eventualis to intention, even in German
criminal theory. See Greg Taylor, Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 99 (2004).

31

2014]

THE TURN TO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

permit), the results will likely be quite different to those that materialized
in ATS litigation.85
Overall, the plurality of complicity standards leading ATS scholars
found so ill suited to calculating a single test in customary international
law86 is less of a problem if these cases are heard in national criminal
courts. In such instances, these national criminal courts will apply the
standard of accomplice liability that is native to that forum, preferring a
single local standard over a rule artificially distilled from the catalogue on
offer globally. As a matter of doctrine, then, a turn to international
criminal justice offers both nuance and a greater degree of precision than
was evident within ATS litigation. This is not to say that a plurality of
standards of accomplice liability is easy to work with, will be understood
by relevant audiences in far-away places, will prevent against corporate
races to the bottom, or will ensure the much coveted “level playing field”
globally. In fact, in a forthcoming piece, I argue that these and a range of
other attendant difficulties militate in favor of adopting a single global
standard for complicity.87 The only question is, what should that standard
be?
C.

Towards a Moral Theory of Accomplice Liability

During the course of the ATS’s lifespan, there was a real paucity of
normative engagement with the theory of accomplice liability.88 The turn
85

That eventuality may also be close at hand—dolus eventualis is sufficient for
complicity in Switzerland. DUPUIS, GELLER, AND MONNIER, supra note 33 at 191 (“Le
complice doit avoid l’intention de favoriser la commission de l’infraction, mais le dol
éventuel suffit.”).
86
Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1945 (arguing that complicity debates in ATS litigation were
plagued by ambiguity because of different national and international notions of the
concept).
87
James G. Stewart, Ten Reasons for Adopting a Universal Concept of Participation in
Atrocity, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Elies Van Sliedregt &
Vasiliev eds., 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343392 (arguing for a universal standard
of blame attribution, including complicity, for the following ten reasons: to ensure a level
playing field; to restrain illiberal excess, to prevent arbitrary choices of law, to establish
clear standards, to ensure that standards are neutral between traditions, that they are not
imposed through force, to abandon custom as a basis for determining these standards, to
overcome the Western technocratic legalese that unnecessarily pervades much of this
criminal doctrine, to perform a didactic function for Western states instead of just for
others, to simplify practice, and to save costs).
88
Alan Sykes’ thoughtful article is one of the few exceptions. According to Sykes, we
should abandon both the knowledge and purpose standards for accomplice liability in
favor of a test that turns on whether the company had substantial leverage over the
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to ICL, however, presents an opportunity to rectify this relative silence by
drawing on the relationship between moral philosophy and the theory of
criminal law to ensure that international notions of accomplice liability are
assigned meanings that are politically representative, but neither illiberal
nor unjustifiably permissive. As things transpire, there is much debate
about what standard of accomplice liability is normatively preferable
within these fields, which will become suddenly relevant once these cases
become more about moral blame than civil recovery. Christopher Kutz,
for example, argues that international criminal courts have extended
aiding and abetting too far,89 whereas Michael Moore and innumerable
violation in question. Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts under
the Alien Tort Statute and beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161 (2011)
(“the standards for corporate liability might usefully evolve to target liability toward
scenarios in which the corporation plausibly has substantial leverage over the conduct of
the host state as well as cases in which the involvement of the host state is peripheral and
the primary misconduct is attributable to corporate agents.”). I agree with Sykes that we
should abandon both the purpose and knowledge tests as static standards, but I later
disagree with him that the substantial leverage standard he argues for makes any sense in
the criminal law. For my normative critique of both knowledge and purpose standards of
complicity, see Stewart, supra note 48, 195–199. I suspect, however, that there is no
necessary disagreement between us on this score, since I agree with his insightful
observation that “It is not obvious that the international standards for criminal aiding and
abetting, which afford a basis for criminal sanctions against individuals such as
imprisonment, are the appropriate standards in relation to civil liability.” Id. As an aside,
I agree with that proposition, but think that negligence should be the appropriate standard
for corporate complicity in a civil context in order to tie complicity to due diligence
requirements. That position is tangential to this project, however, so I do not defend it
here.
89
Christopher Kutz, The Philosophical Foundations of Complicity Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 22 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds.,
2011) (“The weaker criterion in international criminal law, which requires only
recklessness on the secondary party’s part as to the principal’s commission of the crime,
represents a substantial, even dangerous, weakening of the standard, and so confuses
complicity law”). For skepticism about Kutz’s misgivings about reckless complicity, see
Sanford H Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 386 (1996)
(arguing that reckless complicity need not raise objections that are not already applicable
to reckless perpetration). Andrew Simester, The Mental Element in Complicity, 122 L. Q.
REV. 578–601 (2006) (expressing concern about mental elements for complicity lower
than “purpose”, concluding that “[t]he better starting point is to distinguish culpability
from responsibility, and to focus on the latter.”); Simon Bronitt, Defending Giorgianni Part One: The Fault Required for Complicity, 17 CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL 242 (1993);
Simon Bronitt, Defending Giorgianni - Part Two: New Solutions for Old Problems in
Complicity, 17 CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL 305–318 (1993) (defending an elevated mental
element for accomplice liability in Australia); Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose
and the Draft Code - 1, CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 4 (1990); Glanville Williams,
Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code - 2, CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 98 (1990) (raising a
series of perverse scenarios that would arise if accomplice liability is assigned a lower
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others stand opposed to a strong purpose standard for accomplice liability
across all crimes.90 The point is that regardless of how complicity is
defined as a matter of doctrine, or who prevails in the contest between
“knowledge” and “purpose” if this binary is the universe of available
options, the rise of corporate responsibility will place new emphasis on
normative debates about the shape accomplice liability should take
globally.91
mental element, including, most memorably, the responsibility of the author Agatha
Christie for copycat crimes her imaginative novels inspire). In a forthcoming piece, I
respond to Glanville Williams’ reductio ad absurdum and other misgivings mentioned
here. See James G. Stewart, The Accomplice Liability of Arms Vendors: A Conceptual
Defense, forthcoming.
90
Michael S Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 395 (2007) (arguing that because all forms of complicity share the same
causal structure as perpetration, there are no metaphysical bases for granting complicity
its own separate ontology); I take Gideon Yaffe to be against a strong purpose standard
too, when he argues that an intention to contribute to the crime is sufficient, and that “an
intention can commit one to an event’s occurrence without committing one to promoting
the event, or making it more likely to take place.” See Gideon Yaffe, Intending to Aid, 33
LAW & PHIL. 1–40, 1 (2014); Sanford H Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1996) (arguing that recklessness should suffice for complicity when
it is sufficient for perpetration of the crime in question, which by definition, means
purpose should not apply as a mental element for complicity across the board); LARRY
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 7-10 (1 ed. 2009) (arguing that insufficient concern is the baseline for all
forms of criminal responsibility, although controversially, they would carve out a safehabor for commerce). Based on empirical studies of expectations in the community, Paul
Robinson and John Darley also found “stark disagreement” with the purpose standard for
complicity. See PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN M DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1996) (concluding that “[f]rom the
point of view of our respondents, the culpability requirement as to result should not be
elevated to purposeful... instead, the offense should be graded according to the degree of
culpability that the accomplice shows.”). Foreign theorists are seemingly unanimous in
their disagreement with the purpose standard. See e.g., Claus Roxin, Strafrecht,
Allgemeiner Teil. Bd. 2: Besondere Erscheinungsformen der Straftat (1. A. ed. 2003),
231 ff. (defending dolus eventualis as the lower limit of accomplice liability); ENRIQUE
GIMBERNAT ORDEIG, AUTOR Y CÓMPLICE EN DERECHO PENAL X (2006) (same);
DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, DER EINHEITSTÄTER IM STRAFRECHT (1971) (arguing against an
elevated mental element for complicity in favor of a dynamic standard that correlates
with that announced in the particular crime a defendant is charged with); THOMAS
ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR VON EINEM
DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIV-FUNKTIONALEN
STRAFTATLEHRE (2009) (same). Again, for my own (neutral) synthesis of these
competing theories of accomplice liability, see James G. Stewart, Complicity, in OXFORD
CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (forthcoming 2014) (Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds.)
91
As I mention earlier, I have argued that ICL should adopt what continental lawyers call
a unitary theory of perpetration, where complicity shares the same elements as
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This is especially true if there is ever some political appetite to consider
promulgating a universal standard, but these questions will inevitably
resurface regardless. Take the recent “specific direction” affair. Earlier
this year, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rendered a judgment in the case of
Momčilo Perišić declaring that the actus reus of complicity must be
“specifically directed” towards the consummated crime in order to
constitute complicity,92 but the Special Court for Sierra Leone disagreed
in the Charles Taylor appeal some months later,93 and the ICTY Appeals
Chamber ultimately reversed itself in a subsequent proceeding. Although I
certainly accept that specificity is a recurrent issue in the theory of aiding
and abetting, I have written at length criticizing “specific direction” as
constructed in ICL, arguing that this new standard is inconsistent with
customary international law, without precedence in doctrinal
understandings of complicity anywhere, and at odds with theoretical
accounts of accomplice liability.94 Intriguingly, however, ATS litigation
was struggling with this confused concept well before it attracted any
attention internationally.
In expressing apprehension about the curious idea of “specific
direction” as a form of actus reus, one appellate judge in the Khulumani
litigation pointed out that:
I note a possible tension in the tribunals’ definition aiding
and abetting under which the necessary mens rea is knowing
assistance…, yet requires that the act of assistance be
‘specifically directed to assist the perpetration of a specific
perpetration, and therefore disappears into a more capacious single notion of criminal
responsibility. I argue that this should be the case whenever international crimes are
charged, whether before international criminal courts and tribunals or national courts. See
Stewart, supra note 48. For the beginnings of a debate that I hope continues with
corporations (and other actors) in mind, see Darryl Robinson, Jens Ohlin and Thomas
Weigend’s criticisms of my earlier argument and my responses to them. Infra note 53.
92
Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. Yugo., Feb.
28, 2013).
93
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No.SCSL-03-01-A-1389, Appeal
Judgment, 5–30 (SCSL Sept. 26 2013).
94
James G. Stewart, THE ICTY LOSES ITS WAY ON COMPLICITY – PART 1 OPINIO JURIS,
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses-its-way-on-complicity-part-1/
(last visited Feb 13, 2014); James G. Stewart, THE ICTY LOSES ITS WAY ON COMPLICITY
– PART 2 OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/03/guest-post-the-icty-loses-itsway-on-complicity-part-2/ (last visited Feb 13, 2014); James G. Stewart, “SPECIFIC
DIRECTION” IS UNPRECEDENTED: RESULTS FROM TWO EMPIRICAL STUDIES EJIL: TALK!,
http://www.ejiltalk.org/specific-direction-is-unprecedented-results-from-two-empiricalstudies/ (last visited Feb 13, 2014). For a summary of my writings on “specific
direction,” see http://www.law.ubc.ca/faculty/stewart/direction.html.
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crime.’ I express no view on how, if at all, this possible
tension might be resolved.95
The inclusion of “if at all” was prescient, since the possible tension the
judge pointed to was in fact an important contradiction soon to be
overturned.96 The implications of this single anecdote are, nonetheless,
significant: first, ATS cases can also have a didactic role for the turn to
corporate criminal liability for international crimes (underscoring the
possibility of synergies I mentioned by way of introduction); second, these
sorts of questions can only be adequately resolved within a philosophical
robust vision of accomplice liability; and finally, more and more human
rights advocates will probably see themselves weighing in on essentially
philosophical debates with increasing frequency. Human Rights Watch,
for instance, publicly opposed “specific direction” on principled
grounds.97
There may be more of this to come if ICL assumes some of the load the
ATS was traditionally asked to carry. A leading ATS advocate, for
instance, has argued that “business as usual or not, if corporations are
complicit in human rights violations, the victims of the abuses have a legal
right to compensation from those corporations.”98 And yet, criminal
theorists beg to differ. In the Anglo-American world, intellectual leaders
like George Fletcher, Andrew Ashworth and Anthony Duff oppose the
application of complicity to “normal” business transactions,99 and an
95

Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); Ntsebeza v.
Daimler Chrysler Corp, 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir 2007), n.15.
96
The ICTY recently overturned its own previous caselaw that had upheld the “specific
direction” standard. See Prosecutor v. Šainović et al, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment,
(2014). I should be clear, however, that while I view “specific direction” as a
contradiction when treated as part of the actus reus, I have pointed to the need to consider
these types of considerations as justifications in international criminal law. For
theoretical literature discuss the relationship between complicity and justifications in the
criminal law, see Douglas Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability of
Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491 (1989); Hans-Ludwig Schreiber,
Problems of Justification and Excuse in the Setting of Accessorial Conduct, 1986 BYU L.
REV. 611 (1986).
97
Kenneth Roth, A Tribunal’s Legal Stumble, N. Y. TIMES, July 9, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/opinion/global/a-tribunals-legal-stumble.html (last
visited Feb 13, 2014). I advised Human Rights Watch’s lawyers about “specific
direction” prior to the Op-ed’s publication, although I never saw a written draft.
98
Beth Stevens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 45, 46 (2002).
99
The tendency among theorists of criminal law is to treat the shopkeeper’s complicity as
omission liability, thereby absolving the shopkeeper of the responsibility to refuse the
sale. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 420–421 (1978) (“The
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extensive literature in German criminal theory questions the propriety of
punishing “neutral acts,” viz. practices that further crimes but that remain
“neutral” insofar as they arise through and are typical for an individual’s
profession.100 Although, personally, I am not convinced by these
arguments,101 they do highlight a fresh set of conceptual problems that did
not register within debates about the ATS. With any luck, considering
these issues now in the context of corporate criminal liability for
international crimes will bring us closer to a justifiable moral account of
this form of accountability.
At the risk of laboring the point, let me again insist how significant this
shift in perspective will be for scholarly treatment of these problems. In an
thoughtful recent article, Daniel Abebe argues that the emphasis on
doctrine within ATS litigation and scholarship “masks underlying
international relations theory assumptions that are the true motivations of
the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation
under the ATS.”102 While that may well be true, the foregoing shows how
both doctrine and international relations theory mask the deeper questions
of moral responsibility that arise from these cases and how reframing
these allegations in ICL brings these moral problems into sharper relief.
Put differently, insisting on a criminal approach to the accountability of
commercial actors for atrocity recalibrates the analysis by rebalancing the
undervalued moral beneath with the widely disputed political above.103
supplier knowingly contributes to the crime, but the question is whether he must deviate
from the ordinary course of commercial life in order to hinder his customer’s criminal
plan.”); R A Duff, “Can I Help You?” Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist,
10 LEGAL STUDIES 165–181, 178–180 (1990) (“If it is not our responsibility, in law, to
go out of our way to prevent the occurrence of harms or crimes which we did not
ourselves originate, why should the shopkeeper have a legal responsibility to go out of
her normal way to prevent her customers taking criminal advantage of her services?”);
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 412 (6 ed. 2009) (“the shopkeeper
is simply selling goods in the normal course of business, and the borrower is merely
fulfilling a duty to restore the goods to their owner. If the law were to regard either of
these acts as ‘aiding’ it would be requiring the defendants to do something abnormal in
the circumstances and - in effect - punishing them for the omission to do the abnormal
thing.”)
100
See, e.g., PETER RACKOW, NEUTRALE HANDLUNGEN ALS PROBLEM DES STRAFRECHTS
(2007); HANS KUDLICH, DIE UNTERSTÜTZUNG FREMDER STRAFTATEN DURCH
BERUFSBEDINGTES VERHALTEN (2004).
101
See James G. Stewart, The Accomplice Liability of Arms Vendors: A Conceptual
Defense (forthcoming, 2015).
102
Daniel Abebe, Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and
International Human Rights Litigation, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2007).
103
Ideally, of course, the moral theory would intersect with the political as is the case, for
instance, in Thomas Pogge’s exceptional treatment of moral responsibility for global
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This recalibration emerges as a recurrent theme—as we will observe later,
complicity is just one site where this reorientation will have significant
implications if cases like Argor-Heraeus materialize (and perhaps, among
scholars, even if they do not).
III. TRANSCENDING THE ATS’S IMPASSE ON CORPORATE LIABILITY
Whether corporations can be held liable for international crimes was
another perennial point of contestation in ATS litigation.104 Initially, ATS
cases targeted only individuals, but as I mentioned earlier, the attraction of
larger awards and the sheer extent of corporate malfeasance in global
markets soon saw a shift to commercial cases.105 As a matter of history,
courts began by simply assuming that corporations could be sued under
the rubric of the ATS and this practice caught on as one court uncritically
cited another, but the apparently settled practice was interrupted by a
sudden prise de conscience—the assumption might be false.106 Initially,
Kiobel was pegged to address the question of corporate responsibility for
international crimes based on the laws of nations, until a second surprise
in the form of a re-argument order pre-empted the question. Ultimately,
poverty. See Pogge, supra note 40. In fact, Pogge’s project is remarkably similar to my
own, in that we both deny state sovereignty the ability to impede the reach of basic moral
responsibilities. We deny, therefore, Thomas Nagel’s (and others) view that moral
responsibilities (of businesspeople and their corporations) are particular to nation states.
See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113–147
(2005); In any event, Grietje Baars’ excellent Marxist criticism of this discourse as
normalizing the excesses of capitalism seems dangerous in prioritizing the political
exclusively, without adequate regard to the moral. A Marxist system of government way
well diminish the frequency of resource wars, but will it also eviscerate basic moral
principles like complicity? Baars, supra note 34. Again, I believe the moral and political
come apart, are not necessarily antagonistic, and require reconciliation.
104
Prior to the Kiobel decision, the Second Circuit had itself rendered contradictory
decisions on the matter, as had a range of other appellate courts. For a full history, see
Wuerth, supra note 14, at 605.
105
Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute:
A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 353, 357–363 (2010).
106
Id.; For Eugene Kontorovich, the decision took practitioners and academics by
surprise. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent
With International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21 (2014) (stating that the only
treatment of the question of extraterritoriality came in 2003, within a student note, and
the issue was not raised by scholars or anyone else); There were, however, early calls for
jurisdictional limitations on the scope of the ATS. See John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort
Statute and How Individuals Violate International Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 60
(1988) (concluding the article by pointing out that “[a] meaningful jurisdictional
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute is the logical alternative.”).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction proved ATS’s downfall for “foreign cubed”
cases, leaving the corporate issue hanging. In what follows, I argue that
ICL offers a decidedly less thorny path through these problems to the
desired destination.
A.

From Custom to Legislation

The debate about corporate liability under the ATS frequently focused
on the status of corporations in customary international law—eminent
international jurists were commissioned to write expert briefs in Talisman
declaring that custom knew of no such thing as a corporate international
crime,107 and in typically erudite form, José Alvarez cautioned against
bequeathing international personality on corporations so quickly if our
concern was human dignity.108 In response, human rights advocates wisely
beat retreat to general principles of law,109 in order to showcase how
corporate responsibility for serious torts was a hallmark of legal systems
everywhere, even if state practice of this type of case is hard to come
by.110 In a third strategy, many appealed to federal common law as a
source for corporate responsibility,111 rightly pointing out that “in legal

107

See the Briefs of Professors Crawford, Greenwood, and Shaw in Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) and 131 S.Ct 79 (2010)
(No. 09-1262).
108
José Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L. L. (2011).
109
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) Brief of Amici Curiae
Center For Constitutional Rights, International Human Rights Organizations and
International Law Experts In Support of Petitioners, No. 10-1491, (filed July 13, 2011).
110
By chance, Philip Alston and Bruno Simma had argued for a very similar approach in
the field of international human rights generally, several decades beforehand. See Bruno
Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and
General Principles, 12 AUST. YBIL 82 (1988) (arguing that an over-reliance on
customary international law was often unconvincing whether there was little state
practice to support the contention, instead preferencing general principles of law as an
alternative basis for producing international human rights norms).
111
Wuerth, supra note 51, at 1933 (“applying international law as part of a federal
common law that governs all aspects of ATS may change the outcome of cases that turn
on issues like secondary and corporate liability.”) At least two courts followed this
approach, and it is evident in Judge Leval’s separate opinion in Kiobel. See In re Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re South
Africa Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum, Nos. 06-4800-cv, 2010 WL 3611392, (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (Leval,
J., concurring). Julian Ku, however, criticizes this reasoning for failing to take into
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parlance one does not refer to the tort of ‘corporate battery’ as a cause of
action.”112 Part of the attraction of ICL pure, however, is that it need not
rely on customary international law or common law at all.
Legislation enables corporate criminal liability for international crimes
in many national systems, through a quintessentially transnational legal
process. To borrow from Harold Koh’s computing metaphor, transnational
law is a kind of domestic/international hybrid that, in this instance at least,
takes the form of a “download” from international to domestic.113
International law defines the international crimes, then these offenses are
incorporated into national criminal law through cross-reference or (to mix
the metaphor slightly) a copy and paste. Once within the national sphere,
the international-crimes-made-national partner with whatever domestic
standards of blame attribution come with the system. There are three
dominant methodologies by which corporate criminal liability for
international crimes is achieved through this process, but each of them
depends on legislative provisions that make this coupling between
corporate criminal liability and international crimes explicit to varying
degrees, and each dispenses with customary international law or common
law entirely.
First, a large number of states that adopt a comprehensive criminal
code dedicate a specific provision within these codes to corporate criminal
liability, before going on to prohibit international crimes in subsequent
sections. In Australia, for example, the Commonwealth Criminal Code of
1995 first states that “[t]his Code applies to bodies corporate in the same
way as it applies to individuals,” then explicitly lists the full panoply of
modern international crimes barring only aggression.114 In Europe, half of
account the Supreme Court’s language in Sosa, which emphasized that international law
governs forms of responsibility within ATS suits. See Ku, supra note 105, at 392–394.
112
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011), at 54.
113
Koh, supra note 36, at 745.
114
See § 12.1(1), Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 (“This Code applies to bodies
corporate in the same way as it applies to individuals,”). For an analysis of the
potentiality of these provisions, see Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of
Corporations for International Crimes, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 809 (2007). For comparable provisions, see § 48(a), Norwegian General Civil
Penal Code; Section 5, Belgian Criminal Code (“[t]oute personne morale est pénalement
responsable des infractions qui sont intrinsèquement liées à la réalisation de son objet ou
à la défense de ses intérêts, ou de celles dont les faits concrets démontrent qu’elles ont été
commises pour son compte.”); Likewise, Art. 121 of the French Penal Code is translated
into English as “Legal persons, with the exception of the State, are criminally liable for
the offenses committed on their account by their organs or representatives.” Francophone
scholars show renewed interest in corporate criminal liability within Europe, including its
intersection with international crimes. See e.g., LA RESPONSABILITÉ PÉNALE DES
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the national legal systems allow corporations to be convicted of all crimes
announced in the criminal code, because these states deliberately decided
to construct a concept of corporate criminal liability that applied to all
criminal offences.115 By this legislative method, much of the doctrinal
debate about corporate liability in ATS litigation and scholarship falls
away.
Second, a range of states create corporate criminal liability within their
criminal codes, then specify a limited subset of criminal offenses that
corporations can commit. Sometimes, this subset includes international
offenses. To stay with Europe momentarily, nine states designate a
circumscribed class of criminal offenses that corporate actors can
commit,116 three of which explicitly extend corporate criminal liability to
“crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”117 By
this method, too, corporations can be held criminally responsible for
international crimes without engaging in the contested methodologies that
hampered the ATS. Admittedly, these examples represent just a small
fraction of the world’s legal systems, but the explanation demonstrates the
method by which certain criminal jurisdictions construct corporate
responsibility for international crimes through legislation. On this reading,
corporate responsibility for international crimes is the latent legal
possibility the ATS once was, just in considerably more places.
Third, in a slightly more circuitous route, another group of jurisdictions
have promulgated separate legislation mandating that the term “person”
(or its equivalent) be read as including both natural and legal persons in all
other legislative enactments. In the United States, for instance, the War
Crimes Act stipulates that “whoever” commits a war crime is subject to
criminal punishment including fine, imprisonment and death.118 The
Dictionary Act of 2000 states that “[i]n determining the meaning of any
Act of Congress… the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”119 One should, of course,
PERSONNES MORALES  : PERSPECTIVES EUROPÉENNES ET INTERNATIONALES, 30
(Geneviève Giudicelli-Delage & Stefano Manacorda eds.).
115
BONDT, VERMEULEN, AND RYCKMAN, supra note 31, at 80–84.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (2006).
119
Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). For similar results in Canada, see the combined
effect of section 35 of the Interpretation Act, R.S. 1985, c. I-21 and the Canadian Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24). Section 6(1) of the Canadian
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act states that: “Every person who, either
before or after the coming into force of this section, commits outside Canada
(a) genocide,
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guard against the expectation that this type of reading will always pay
dividends—the U.S. Supreme Court has already rejected an analogous
argument in a cognate context.120 Still, the damage caused by this
precedent (if it does migrate beyond the Torture Victims Protection Act) is
contained in the field of corporate criminal liability for international
crimes. How so? Well, because most legal systems have absorbed the
century-old U.S. precedent accepting corporate criminal liability,121 its
potential coupling with international crimes cannot be shut down by any
single judicial finding.
Fourth, in at least two international courts, corporate criminal liability
for international crimes is either a newly minted phenomenon created
within a regional treaty, or far more controversially, an inherent power in
contempt proceedings before an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. As
for the former, in June 2014, members of the African Union (AU)
approved a protocol that gave to the newly reconstituted African Court of
Justice and Human Rights the ability to try corporations for international
crimes.122 The AU’s resolution attracted considerable global interest,
(b) a crime against humanity, or
(c) a war crime,
is guilty of an indictable offence and may be prosecuted for that offence in accordance
with section 8. Section 35 of the Interpretation Act stipulates that “[i]n every enactment
… person, or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation.” In
England and Wales, the International Criminal Court Act 2001 confers British courts
with jurisdiction over international crimes carried out “outside the United Kingdom by a
United Kingdom national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject to UK service
jurisdiction.” Section 5 of the Interpretations Act 1978 states that “[i]n any Act, unless
the contrary intention appears, words and expressions listed in Schedule 1 to this Act are
to be construed according to that Schedule.” The Schedule states that “‘[p]erson’ includes
a body of persons corporate or unincorporate.”
120
See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S.Ct. 1702, (2012).
121
In this respect, corporate criminal liability represents an exception to the fact that the
US normally imports substantive criminal law, while exporting criminal procedure.
Elisabetta Grande, Comparative Criminal Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 191, 204 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). On legal
transplants generally, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974).
122
See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court
of Justice and Human Rights, May 15, 2014, STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1, Art. 46C. The
provision was adopted by the Assembly of the African Union in its Twenty-Third
Ordinary Session between 26-27 June 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. See Decision
on the Draft Legal Instruments, Doc. Assembly/AU/8(XXIII), at 1 in African Union,
Decisions,
Declarations
And
Resolution,
Assembly/AU/Dec.517-545(XXIII)
http://summits.au.int/en/23rdsummit/documents/decisions-declarations-and-resolutionassembly-union-twenty-third-ordinary-sess (“The Assembly… 2. ADOPTS the legal
instruments as follows:… (e) Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of
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primarily because it also caved to political pressure to offer sitting heads
of state immunity from prosecution—a position many viewed as
reprehensible backsliding.123 At the same time, the protocol was
progressive with respect to another set of actors who have enjoyed de
facto immunity everywhere for all time. Under the heading “Corporate
Criminal Liability”, the newly adopted protocol insists that “[f]or the
purpose of this Statute, the Court shall have jurisdiction over legal
persons, with the exception of States.”124 It then goes on to detail various
rules by which this form of responsibility will be judged.
Once again, this legislative grounding dispenses with the need for
discussing customary international law’s treatment of the issue, as was a
frequent prerequisite within ATS litigation. There is little doubt that a
regional treaty can promulgate standards that extend beyond the scope of

the African Court of Justice and Human Rights”.) I am grateful to Tara O’Leary at
Redress, Nicole Fritz at the Southern Africa Litigation Centre and Professor Charles
Jalloh for help accessing this information, and for insights into the negotiating process
that led to this provision.
123
Article 46A bis of the adopted Protocol states “No charges shall be commenced or
continued before the Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or
anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on
their functions, during their tenure of office.” Id. For the extensive discussion of this
provision on immunity, see Adam Nossiter & Marlise Simons, African Leaders Grant
Themselves Immunity in Proposed Court, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 2, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/world/africa/african-leaders-grant-themselvesimmunity-in-proposed-court.html (last visited Aug 21, 2014); Monica Mark, African
Leaders Vote Themselves Immunity from New Human Rights Court, THE GUARDIAN, July
3, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jul/03/african-leadersvote-immunity-human-rights-court (last visited Aug 21, 2014); Beth Van Schaack,
Immunity Before the African Court of Justice & Human & Peoples Rights—The Potential
Outlier Just Security, http://justsecurity.org/12732/immunity-african-court-justicehuman-peoples-rights-the-potential-outlier/ (last visited Aug 21, 2014). To the best of my
knowledge, commentary on the sudden internationalization of corporate criminal liability
for international crimes is nil, meaning that ironically (once more), the latent, unnoticed
phenomenon had to be “discovered” by surprise. As for the term “backsliding,” I borrow
it from Andrew Guzman and Katarina Linos’ recent work discussing human rights
backsliding, although the analogy does not work at all neatly with their argument, since
they are concerned with instances where human rights “undermine efforts to adopt or
maintain high levels of protection in countries that would otherwise offer protections
above the international norm.” African backtracking on immunity in international
criminal courts does not fit that bill, although I wonder if Kiobel’s severe contraction of
the ATS does. See Andrew T. Guzman & Katerina Linos, Human Rights Backsliding,
102 CAL. L. REV. 603–654, 605 (2014).
124
See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court
of Justice and Human Rights, supra note 122, Art. 46C.
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customary international law,125 as part of what many have championed as
a divergent regionalism in international criminal justice.126 In this light,
the AU protocol is for the African Court what legislation adopting
corporate criminal liability is to national legal systems—a step beyond the
protracted disputes about customary international law or general principles
of law in public international law onto a more solid positivist footing. In
this sense, corporate criminal liability is undeniably on safer ground than
the recent decision of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to indict a
media company for contempt,127 although even there the “discovery” of
corporate criminal liability is a lesser leap of faith than it was for the US
Supreme Court in 1909, when it initially signed off on the concept.
125

In fact, the African Union has some considerable experience doing just this in other
contexts. Article 4(j) of the Protocol establishing the AU’s Peace and Security Council
famously insisted on “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act.” See African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Art. 4(j), July 9, 2002, available online
at www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf. The problem with
this treaty provision was never that it cut across customary norms on the use of force; it
was that it appeared inconsistent with Article 53 of the UN Charter, which requires that
“no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”. See in this regard, Thomas
M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in
an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 88, 100 (2006) (discussing this
provision in the context of Art 53 of the UN Charter, without raising objections about the
provision’s novelty relative to contrary customary norms).
126
William W Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729 (2003) (offering various
rationale for the regionalization of ICL).
127
In January 2014, a Judge at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon found that a Lebanese
media company named Akhbar Beirut S.A.L could be tried for contempt for disclosing
the identities of protected witnesses. See In the Case Against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L and
Ibrahim Mohamed Al Amin, STL-14-06/I/CJ/, Redacted Version of Decision in
Proceedings for Contempt with Orders in Lieu of an Indictment, Jan 31, 2014. In a way,
the decision has only tangential value for this paper, since Judge Baragwanath found that
the STL does not have jurisdiction over corporations for garden-variety international
crimes, but that “the logic demanding this conclusion does not call for such limitation in
the case of contempt.” Id., ¶ 21. Intriguingly, however, a separate judge appointed to try
the very same reached the opposite view, even with respect to contempt, concluding that
he did not have jurisdiction over the company. For the decision on the challenge to
jurisdiction, see In the Case Against New TV S.A.L and Karma Mohamed Tahsin Al
Khayat, STL-14-05/PT/CJ, Decision on Motion Challenging Jurisdiction and on Request
for Leave to Amend Order in Lieu of an Indictment, Jul. 24, 2014. The issue is now
pending before the STL’s Appeals Chamber. Note that all of this discussion is specific to
the STL, and therefore has little bearing on the bases for corporate criminal liability for
international crimes I mention here.
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I offer no opinion about the merit of the judicial “discovery” of
corporate criminal liability at the STL, except to observe how familiar that
argumentative strategy for it will be to ATS litigants—corporate criminal
liability is: not expressly excluded, ubiquitous elsewhere, important for
reasons of justice and enabled by associated rules.128 On their face, these
arguments strike me as perfectly plausible given the history of corporate
criminal liability, but nowhere near as convincing as the express
legislative bases for corporate criminal liability for international crimes I
point to. These stronger legislative foundations have sweeping
implications—they immediately move us beyond the pervasive but overly
restrictive understanding that “[c]orporations are not presently subject to
criminal liability under international law.”129 At least for Africa, that view
is now outdated, but more significantly, it always had the unfortunate
(unintended) effect of obscuring the many opportunities for corporate
criminal liability for international crimes within national legal systems
throughout the world, which some see as both the history and future of
ICL.
So, migrating these cases into corporate criminal liability (and liability
of corporate officers) will not magically solve the political and economic
considerations these cases arguably engendered in the ATS or prevent
powerful economic actors from politically out-maneuvering prosecutors in
128

Judge Baragwanath’s reasoning makes each of these points in the STL decision that
allowed for corporate criminal liability: (a) Not expressly excluded - “On its face, [the
rule prohibiting contempt] neither embraces nor rejects such liability in the contempt
context.” and “no other provision… limits the Rule's application to natural persons.” Id.,
¶ 19; (b) Ubiquity - “Criminal liability for legal persons, such as corporations, is a
familiar and increasingly pervasive legal construct in national systems based on the
premise that the criminal conduct of certain natural persons done in their official capacity
should be attributed under criminal law to the legal entity on whose behalf they acted.”
Id., ¶ 18; (c) Importance for reasons of justice - “To limit criminal liability for contempt
to individual natural persons risks undermining the justice process; for the actual and
most powerful culprits of any proved interference with justice would go untried.” Id., ¶
28; and (d) Enabled by associated rules - “most notably for our purposes, Lebanon has
embraced and codified corporate criminal liability.” Id., ¶ 26.
129
Ronald C Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 955, 955 (2007); See also, NICOLA JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY 232 (2002) (“The existing mechanisms
created for prosecuting violators of international criminal law currently offer no
possibilities for the prosecution of corporations”). Developments in the Law-Corporate
Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025,
2030-2031 (2001) (arguing that “international law views corporations as possessing
certain human rights, but it generally does not recognize corporations as bearers of legal
obligations under international criminal law.”) (emphasis in original); ILIAS BANTEKAS,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 76 (4 edition ed. 2010) (“There is no doubt that general
corporate criminal liability does not exist in international law.”).
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certain real instances of alleged corporate offending (as may well take
place in the Argor-Hereaus case). Still, the migration to ICL will provide a
legislative platform for corporate responsibility for international crimes
that is widely dispersed across numerous jurisdictions, and therefore, far
more difficult to dislodge.
B.

Overcoming the ATS Debate

The move to a legislative grounding for corporate responsibility for
international crimes overcomes much of the doctrinal and conceptual furor
in ATS litigation. In terms of doctrine, the majority in the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Kiobel (having just declared that
corporations could not be held responsible for international crimes in
public international law), “[nothing] in this opinion limit[s] or foreclose[s]
criminal, administrative, or civil actions against any corporation under a
body of law other than customary international law—for example the
domestic laws of any State.”130 A state can define its criminal law
governing corporations in terms that extend beyond the scope of
customary international law, and as we have seen, many do.131 States, in
other words, are perfectly free to do internally that which the African
Union has achieved regionally. As such, from a doctrinal vantage point,
reprocessing ATS cases as allegations of corporate responsibility for
international crimes has potentially distinct advantages, which spoil many
of the normative objections offered up against the ATS.
At the level of theory, the various methods of incorporation set out
above undercut one of the principal criticisms of the ATS. Throughout its
existence, leading scholars protested the “democratic cost” involved in
allowing customary international law such power.132 As Curtis Bradley
has ably argued, “[b]y its very nature customary international law involves
130

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
For an excellent survey of examples, see WARD FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 23–29 (2006).
132
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. III Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 345–348 (1997) (insisting that
“judicial federalization of CIL without political branch authorization is inconsistent with
American constitutional democracy on two grounds.”); John B. III Bellinger, Enforcing
Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches,
42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 10 (2009) (“In addition to causing diplomatic friction,
ATS litigation also exacts ”costs“ through the lack of democratic checks and
accountability.”). See also, Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights
Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457 (2001).
131
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less US democratic inputs than other forms of law applied by US
courts.”133 According to this critique, the ATS created “democratic costs”
because (a) the legislature enjoys much less ability to scrutinize customary
international law norms (upon which ATS litigation was based); (b)
custom is frequently seriously ambiguous; and (c) conferring unelected
judges with the power to base important transnational judgments on this
source hands lawmaking capacity to the branch of government with the
weakest democratic credentials.134 If one adds the common criticism that
universal jurisdiction violates state sovereignty,135 ATS litigation
seemingly undermines democracy, at home and abroad.
Yet, ICL largely sidesteps all sides of the dispute by washing its hands
of customary international law altogether. As we have just witnessed,
corporate criminal liability for international crimes is available in many
jurisdictions without recourse to customary international law; in the
majority of European states and the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, there is an unequivocal legislative mandate for corporate criminal
liability for international crimes. Elsewhere, the legislature may never
have contemplated corporate criminal liability of international crimes
specifically, but there is still a legislative (not customary) basis for
133

Bradley, supra note 132, at 465. In fairness, other arguments about the ATS’s
“democratic deficiency” point to the absence of procedural checks and balances on
decisions to bring these sorts of cases. See for example, Bellinger, supra note 132, at 10.
Robert Knowles, however, has offered a sophisticated response to these objections, also
from a realist perspective. See Robert Knowles, Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute,
A, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (2010) (arguing that there are good reasons for
engagement in ATS litigation, in part, because handing the executive all power in dealing
with these issues may prove politically disadvantageous).
134
Bradley, supra note 132, at 465–467.
135
Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 132 DAEDALUS 47–63
(2003) (expressing pessimism about universal jurisdiction and other interventionist
strategies as a trump on sovereignty). In truth, there is considerable debate about the
validity of the intuition that universal jurisdiction so clearly violates sovereignty. Larry
May argues that “sovereignty should count as a strong presumption that must be rebutted
if international law, especially international criminal law, is to make any sense.” LARRY
MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 8 (2004); Andrew Altman
and Christopher Wellman, however, reject appeals to “international community” or
“gravity” as a grounding for universal jurisdiction’s incursion into state sovereignty, but
argue instead that widespread or systematic violations of basic human rights in a state
suffice. Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, A Defense of International
Criminal Law, 115 ETHICS 35–67 (2004); For myself, I doubt that a single definitive
answer to the question of universal jurisdiction vs. state sovereignty can be established
without regard to case-by-case variations. After all, as Alejandro Chehtman has
convincingly shown, the rationale for universal jurisdiction are diverse. See ALEJANDRO
CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL PUNISHMENT
122–128 (2010).
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arriving at that conclusion. Consequently, a good portion of the heated
debate within the ATS litigation does not cross over the firebreak to
corporate criminal liability for international crimes. True, cases like
Argor-Heraeus still entail extraterritorial application of the criminal law,
but as Austen Parrish has observed, in democratic terms, the
extraterritorial application of law to a State’s own nationals is an
“innocuous form” of this notion.136 So, perhaps the coming of corporate
liability for international crimes addresses what many scholars saw as an
important democratic failing of its civil predecessor.
If, on the other hand, corporations suddenly find themselves prosecuted
for international crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction, this will only
add a new layer to pre-existing debates that Henry Kissinger, the Law
Lords in Pinochet, members of civil society, legal scholars and
philosophers have already rehearsed when considering universal
jurisdiction for other types of actors.137 We should certainly hold out the
possibility that the application of universal jurisdiction to commercial
actors will come with its own set of normative peculiarities, which make
up part of the new unexplored terrain Argor-Heraeus (or a subsequent
case) initiates. At first glance, though, these cases do not seem to give rise
to democratic considerations that go beyond those international criminal
justice already faces in other scenarios. This arguably holds true
136

Austen L. Parrish, Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality, 28
MD. J. INT’L L. 208, 213 (2013) (“While extraterritorial jurisdiction has innocuous forms
(for example, jurisdiction over one’s own nationals or jurisdiction to punish offenses
directed at state security), it becomes contentious when one state purports to tell
foreigners what they can or cannot do on foreign soil.”). This is not to say that it will be
practically easy. See also, Austen L. Parrish, Domestic Responses to Transnational
Crime: The Limits of National Law, 23 CRIM LAW FORUM 275–293 (2012) (arguing that
extraterritorial exercises of criminal law are highly problematic in practice, and should
not undermine multilateral attempts at regulating global criminal offending).
137
A wide variety of commentators have addressed universal jurisdiction, but its possible
application to corporations and/or their officers awaits more detailed treatment. For a
sense of this variety, see e.g., Henry A Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,
80 FOREIGN AFF. 86 (2001); Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the
Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581, 591–594 (1999); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF LEGISLATION
AROUND THE WORLD - 2012 UPDATE (2012), http://bit.ly/WNhYst; Human Rights
Watch, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART,
http://www.hrw.org/node/11298 (last visited Jul 30, 2014); Máximo Langer, The
Archipelago and the Wheel: Universal Jurisdiction Domestic Prosecutions and the
International Criminal Court, in THE FIRST GLOBAL PROSECUTOR: CONSTRAINTS AND
PROMISE (Alex Whiting, Martha Minow, & True-Frost eds., 2015); LUC REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
(2004); MAY, supra note 135, at 3–19; CHEHTMAN, supra note 135, at 114–139.
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regardless of whether one subscribes to Madeline Morris’ view of the
ICC’s “democracy deficit,”138 believe Aaron Fichtelberg’s liberal response
to her emphasizing fair trials,139 or see universal jurisdiction in more
cosmopolitan terms.140
If this reasoning is sound, it certainly does not suggest that the turn to
ICL will suddenly produce an immaculate system of corporate
accountability that is beyond all reproach, that this new framing is
categorically the preferable response to corporate implication in atrocity,
or that substantial, perhaps even definitive, criticisms might not
undermine the propriety of cases like Aegor-Heraeus in concrete
circumstances moving forward.141 The point is just that ICL not only
enjoys both doctrinal advantages over the earlier regulatory “discoveries”
in corporate accountability, it also has far greater experience addressing
the core conceptual concerns about the role accountability should play
globally. At the very least, therefore, corporate responsibility for ICL
warrants new scholarly attention that bridges multiple intellectual
traditions. After all, the turn moves away from the earlier debates into new
uncharted waters.

138

Madeline Morris, The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 591 (2001); See also, Madeline H. Morris, Democracy, Global
Governance and the International Criminal Court, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 187–193 (Ramesh Chandra Thakur & Peter
Malcontent eds., 2004); Although Morris’ views tend to target the ICC specifically, she
is equally skeptical about universal jurisdiction. On that topic, see Madeline H. Morris,
Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV.
337 (2000).
139
Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court A
Liberal Defence, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 765–785, 776 (2006) (criticizing Morris for
adopting a republican view of democracy, then offering various arguments why a liberal
alternative that prioritizes fair trials might make more sense in the context of modern
ICL).
140
Langer, supra note 137, at 6–14 (discussing the legitimacy of the ICC as compared
with the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states bases on cosmopolitan democracy,
cosmopolitan constitutionalism, global administrative law, and state consent legitimacy).
141
To date, the practical difficulties involved in bringing these sorts of cases have proved
significant. See e.g, GWYNNE SKINNER ET AL., THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL
REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 81–99
(2013),
http://accountabilityroundtable.org/analysis/the-third-pillar-access-to-judicialremedies-for-human-rights-violations-by-transnational-business/ (detailing thwarted
attempts at generating corporate accountability in six different cases that were pursued in
various jurisdictions). There is also outstanding criticism of this entire movement, which
demands careful consideration. See Baars, supra note 34 (arguing that lawyers calling for
corporate accountability for international crimes are congealing capitalism by paving the
way for imperialist corporate expansionism).
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C.

New Standards for Corporate Attribution

In what follows, I provide one limited illustration of new substantive
questions generated by the turn to corporate criminal liability for
international crimes. Specifically, the shift will entail a new variety of
standards for attributing criminal wrongdoing to the corporation, many of
which will be quite alien to ATS litigants and scholars. The ATS was
always predicated on the quintessentially American notion of respondeat
superior, which makes the company vicariously liable for crimes as soon
as any employee is deemed guilty of them.142 As a consequence, the task
was always to pin the violation of international law on any employee. For
some, however, respondeat superior is conceptually objectionable—
scholars like Richard Epstein regret its ability to create vicarious corporate
liability, which is fundamentally illiberal in structure and unfair as a
distributive principle.143 Normative questions of this sort, that seek to
determine under what conditions corporations becomes responsible for
criminal offending of its individual members, are very much part of the
new terrain Argor-Hereaus lifts to the surface of international criminal law
and the numerous fields that connect to it, more or less directly.
Even leaving these sorts of normative questions to the side
momentarily, respondeat superior is decidedly rarer as a matter of doctrine
outside the United States—other countries have adopted alternative
142

I am grateful to Robert Cryer for pointing out the need to emphasize that respondeat
superior in corporate criminal law is not the same as superior responsibility in ICL. Their
conceptual overlap is an intriguing point of debate I do not address here, although from
memory, I recall that war crimes prosecutors are sometimes tempted to appeal to the
former to defend the latter. For the definitive doctrinal treatment of respondeat superior
in US federal criminal law, see RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
AND PREVENTION 3–11 to 3–22 (2004). On the historical development of the concept, see
Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 393–423 (1982).
143
According to Epstein, respondeat superior may be a very sharp instrument, but it fails
to calibrate punishment with responsibility, and is therefore harsh as a distributive
principle. As he says, “potency is not enough; specificity and overkill matter as well.”
Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of
Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL
LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38, 44–45 (2011). In fairness, he also
criticizes corporate criminal liability for its anthropomorphic character and its tendency
to punish innocent shareholders and employees. The concept is the subject of other
criticisms too. See e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 THE
YALE LAW JOURNAL 1231–1280, 1260 (1984). In the context of criminal law, see Bucy,
Pamela H., Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1095–1184 (1991) (arguing that respondeat superior is
objectionable, primarily because it fails to take corporate intentions seriously)
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models of blame attribution that attempt to capture “genuine corporate
culpability,”144 without depending so heavily on the complicity of
company representatives. Building on the groundbreaking scholarly work
of John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse,145 Australian criminal law mandates
that criminal courts can convict companies of offenses for a body
corporate’s failure “to create and maintain a corporate culture that
required compliance with the relevant provision.”146 To return to ArgorHeraeus and the African Court of Justice and human rights, both involve
precisely this type of “corporate culture” based standard for corporate
criminal liability.147 Space does not permit elaboration on this or other
alternative models for allocating criminal blame to corporations,148 but
merely pointing to these alternatives highlights the availability of a whole
host of options, which presently go unaddressed within the comparatively
narrow framing required for ATS cases.
Clearly, employing transnational law to construct corporate
responsibility for international crimes ushers in a whole set of new and
intriguing questions, which we must now turn to in an attempt to foster
accountability that is principled, fair, and functional. In this regard, an
appreciation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of accountability
models like ICL and ATS will be essential in ascertaining the optimal
division of labor between them. This new understanding may also assist in
identifying the added value of other regulatory models or, as Samuel
Moyn and others would have it, broader structural rearrangements that
would better respond to underlying causes of these crimes. At a higher
level of abstraction, hopefully this preliminary sketch of the normative
144

William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 664 (1994)
(discussing four models of corporate culpability that he considers capture genuine
corporate culpability).
145
BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
(1993). Braithwaite is also responsible for thinking about corporate responsibility
globally, which has a real relevance for international criminal law (even if he does not
broach the subject). See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION (2000).
146
Section 12.3(2)(d) Commonwealth Criminal Code Act of 1995, Australia.
147
See Article 102(2), Code Pénal Suisse (stipulating that companies are responsible for
criminal offences “if the corporation can be said to have not taken all reasonable and
necessary organizational measures to prevent such a breach.”). As for the African Court
of Justice and Human Rights, the basis for responsibility is not quite as intense as in
Australia and Switzerland, but it still stipulates that “[c]orporate intention to commit an
offence may be established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act
which constituted the offence.” See
148
For a detailed overview of these standards in all European countries, highlighting that
most adopt mixed standards of attribution, see BONDT, VERMEULEN, AND RYCKMAN,
supra note 31, at 50–72.
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terrain will pave the way for critical scholarly engagement with the
ambitious idea that ICL can, at least partially, regulate global commerce.
Clearly, that proposition will be highly contested, but whatever debate
does arise, it will pay to ensure that these disputes are not unduly
influenced by intuitions that turn out to be particular to the ATS
experience.
Most significantly, the refrain that “[t]he existing mechanisms created
for prosecuting violators of international criminal law currently offer no
possibilities for the prosecution of corporations”149 is true of the most
prominent international institutions, but that reality in no way
overshadows the availability of domestic courts to do that work.
Moreover, it is precisely these courts that enjoy the place of prominence in
the new architecture of international criminal justice, best reflected in the
veritable deluge of domestic prosecutions for international offenses over
the past two decades within national systems, in what Kathryn Sikkink so
memorably describes as a “justice cascade.”150 Turning this lens onto
corporations operating in conflict zones is a natural next step in what has
proved to be, for better or worse, international criminal justice’s light
speed ascendance in the modern era.151 Going forward, part of the role for
both scholars and practitioners, is to determine whether this is a bridge too
far for ICL, or a crucial next step if the field is to avoid the charge of out
and out bias.

149

NICOLA JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF
ACCOUNTABILITY 232 (2002). For a series of similar statements by other excellent
authors, see infra note 129. As I mentioned earlier, many of these views were probably
technically correct as a matter of customary international law, but in my view, their
implicit focus on customary international law alone cloaked an extensive array of
legislative opportunities for corporate criminal liability for international crimes at the
national level, which somewhat ironically, bypass the difficulties ATS litigants always
faced.
150
KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE
CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011).
151
This view is predictive, but it need not assume a teleological view of the discipline,
which Samuel Moyn and others are so critical of in international human rights. See
SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). In keeping with
Kenneth Anderson’s metaphor, I also suspect that this eventuality may be an unintended
consequence of international criminal law in the modern era. See Kenneth Anderson, The
Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 331–358 (2009). Consequently, corporate responsibility for international crimes
vindicates Koskenniemi’s contention that although ICL was a Western construct,
Western states “lost full control of where it might lead.” Koskenniemi was refering to
specific trials though, rather than the direction of the field itself. Martti Koskenniemi,
Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. LAW, 19 (2002).

52

2014]

THE TURN TO CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

IV. THE UPSIDES OF PROSECUTORIAL POWERS
Without doubt, the private right to sue is one of the key advantages of
the ATS system. Victims of international crimes no longer had to plead
with reluctant state officials to mount prosecutions against those
responsible for their suffering (who were often themselves state officials).
Instead, the ATS promised global citizens their day in court, a run-around
past the usual prosecutorial politics (be they local or international), and the
ability to seek compensation from companies with assets on the New York
stock exchange worth contesting. The decline of this aspect of the ATS is
certainly a major loss in a world where access to justice is so acutely
underdeveloped, but reprocessing these cases as international crimes also
has a silver lining, which also demands sober contemplation in the
impoverished world of corporate accountability Kiobel has left us to. In
this Part, I explore some of these upsides, which are now brought into
sharp relief by the possibility of charges in the Argor-Heraeus case and the
realization that, regardless of whether or not this particular allegation
moves forward, it is just the tip of a much larger potentiality that lies in
waiting. As I will show here, these upsides are conceptual, substantive and
pragmatic.
A.

Is Civil Liability Sufficient for Atrocities?

To my mind, euphoria that the ATS provided just some hope for
corporate accountability may have forestalled a series of critical questions
about its adequacy.152 In particular, for all its procedural advantages, is
civil liability a sufficient response to corporate participation in
“unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity.”?153 Compensation may be necessary, but can what Raphael
152

In an intriguing exception several years ago, Beth Stephens accepts that “[p]rivate
litigation, unlike criminal prosecution, does not offer the full force of society’s
condemnation of human rights abuses.” Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence under
International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime, 60 ALB. L. REV. 580 (1996).
153
ICC Statute, supra note 76, Preamble. This lofty language is easy pickings for critics;
it fails to take seriously our pluralistic political aspirations for the world, gives to
humanity more commonality of value than it demonstrates, and the absence of
meaningful reaction (in many instances) suggests that if there is a “shock” it can hardly
be particularly intense. On the first of these, see Brad R. Roth, Coming to Terms with
Ruthlessness: Sovereign Equality, Global Pluralism, and the Limits of International
Criminal Justice, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 231, 284 (2010) (“Where individuals
commit ruthless acts on behalf of political causes to which one is unsympathetic or
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Lemkin calls “barbarous practices reminiscent of the darkest pages of
history”154 really be redressed in purely monetary terms? Particularly in
commercial contexts, the commodification of accountability risks
allowing companies to absorb the cost of responsibility for international
crimes, then pass this expense on to consumers, who pay incrementally
more for weaponry, game consoles, cellphones and engagement rings. The
inescapable threat, however, is that limiting accountability to civil
recovery might allow corporations to purchase massive human rights
violations.
There is much interesting literature contesting the opaque dividing line
between tort and crime, but at least conceptually, if we should have
criminal law at all, it is probably to express moral condemnation in ways
that judicially-imposed redistributions of wealth alone cannot. In 1985,
Richard Posner penned an important article arguing the contrary, based on
his conviction that law and economics had much to offer the crafting of
criminal law doctrine.155 In a direct reaction to Posner’s argument, Doug
Husak has reasserted the autonomous value of criminal responsibility
outside its intersection with tort liability by arguing that the criminal law
“has an expressive function.”156 How, he asks, “could mere compensation
possibly convey the stigma inherent in criminal punishment? If the state
has a substantial interest in expressing condemnation, it is hard to see how
a non-punitive response to core criminality could be adequate.”157
Similarly minded, George Fletcher argues that “economic analysis
indifferent, the acts ”shock the conscience.“ Where the acts are thought to be necessary
expedients in the service of a compelling societal end, they turn out not to be so
shocking, after all.”) (footnotes omitted). While I share these grounds for skepticism to
some extent, I do believe that atrocity is a major shock in the moral education of much of
humanity. In addition, while we should certainly resist its potential to overwhelm all
moral nuance or to “cheat” in Schmittian terms, I also believe that carefully assessing the
role of corporations in this framing is long overdue.
154
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 90 (2008).
155
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193 (1985).
156
DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVER CRIMINALIZATION 186 (2008). For the seminal article in
the English language on expressive theories of punishment, see Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1973). The expressive theory of punishment enjoys considerable
support in ICL too. See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International
Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International
Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39–94 (2007); MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY,
PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173–180 (2007). For a criticism of the
expressive theory, see Nathan Hanna, Say What?: A Critique of Expressive Retributivism,
27 LAW & PHIL. 123–150.
157
HUSAK, supra note 156, at 186.
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misleads us by reducing punishment to the prices that actors pay for
engaging in their preferred conduct.”158 So, in a corporate context,
“substituting civil liability for criminal might be expressively
irrational.”159
Consequently, one can appreciate how ATS advocates preferred civil
liability for international crimes when the alternative was absolute
impunity, but all things being equal, leading theorists believe that the
stigma of criminal offending cannot be adequately conveyed through civil
liability alone. Otherwise, a blanket preference for civil liability risks
doing violence to the expressive aspirations of criminal punishment,
which many view as the raison d’être of criminal responsibility across all
types of defendants. In other words, if civil liability is both a necessary
and sufficient response to atrocity, surely international criminal courts and
tribunals should immediately dispense with the barbarity of punishment,
since it is categorical excess next to civil remedies that neatly do away
with the specious practice of moral blaming. If they do not, the idea that
German, Serb, Rwandan and Congolese military and political leaders
deserve criminal punishment, whereas cash payments will suffice as
restitution from business representatives and their corporations (who
participate in the same German, Serb, Rwandan and Congolese crimes),
risks obvious internal contradiction.
Leading corporate theorists agree with this result, although they tend
to reach the conclusion through a very different line of reasoning. Jack
Coffee, for example, has argued that we should demarcate corporate
criminal and civil liability along essentially moral lines: corporate actions
that society wants to prohibit outright should be criminalized, whereas
practices it wants to price should attract civil penalties companies can pass
on to consumers, who will then use their pocketbooks to punish corporate
offending less directly.160 Immediately, this account raises important
158

GEORGE FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 61 (2007).
Dan M Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 619 (1998) (criticizing economic analyses of corporate criminal liability as
inappropriately leaving out the social meaning of punishment).
160
Coffee, John C., Jr, Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B. U. L. REV. 193–246, 230
(1991). Gerard Lynch, now a Second Circuit judge, ultimately agrees with Coffee,
although like me, he views the prohibit/price dichotomy as boiling down to a purely
moral question. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (“the distinction between prohibition and
pricing is, as Professor Coffee recognizes, ultimately a moral rather than economic
distinction, made for moral rather than economic reasons.”). Like Coffee and Kahan,
Lynch views corporate criminal liability as important above and beyond civil
compensation. Id. at 52. (“Civil sanctions, however, do not serve the unique functions of
159
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concerns about the sufficiency of ATS litigation, at least when corporate
responsibility for heinous crimes is in question. Would civil liability, for
instance, be an adequate sanction for the South African businessman who
allegedly sold 50,000 machetes to the Hutu extremist Théoneste Bagasora
at the zenith of the Rwandan genocide?161 If we think this type of conduct
(in these frightening circumstances) should be absolutely prohibited, the
answer is no—here, civil liability falls short. To be clear, nothing here is
an attack on the ATS as such—I view it as an important form of
accountability—I merely join others in positing that it frequently needs
supplementing with something stronger.
It is also true that by the same token, a purely criminal approach may
have any number of pernicious effects of its own. These might include (a)
providing symbolic punishment that does too little to improve the lot of
victims on the ground;162 (b) over-deterring businesses from operating in
coping economies that desperately need foreign investment to recover

the criminal process in educating the public about basic standards of behavior,
stigmatizing violators, and reinforcing the security, sense of justice, and automatic
compliance of the law-abiding nearly as powerfully as criminal punishment.”). Kahan’s
congruous argument for corporate criminal liability is also grounded in the social
meaning of punishment, which he argues is left out in purely economic analyses of the
problem. Kahan, supra note 159, at 618–622.
161
Kathi Austin, Illicit Arms Brokers: Aiding and Abetting Atrocities, 9 BROWN J.
WORLD AFF. 203 (2002).
162
In the context of corporate responsibility for pillaging conflict commodities, for
example, there is a concern that enforcing title in natural resources will amount to a pure
formalism, depriving local traders of basic sustenance in a survival economy. This,
according, to some commentators will produce a motivation for a return to war, not the
reverse. See DOMINIC JOHNSON & ALOYS TEGERA, DIGGING DEEPER: HOW THE DR
CONGO’S MINING POLICY IS FAILING THE COUNTRY 8 (2005). A similar, but not identical
criticism is made of the Dodd-Franks Act, which sought to use regulatory reporting to
address conflict minerals. See David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, August 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/opinion/howcongress-devastated-congo.html (last visited Aug 9, 2011); For responses from various
actors, see A Conflict Over “Conflict Minerals” in Congo, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
August 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/opinion/a-conflict-over-conflictminerals-in-congo.html (last visited Feb 28, 2013). To my mind, saying that resource
ownership is a pure fiction means Congolese resources are res nullius, replicating
colonialism. More broadly, I believe that those who argue for a fictitious treatment of
property rights have a heavy burden to show that this fiction (and the 4 million dead
since 1998, the highest rates of displacement in recorded history, and the astronomical
incidence of systemic sexual violence it enables) are in the net best interest of the
Congolese people. Finally, I am concerned that these skepticisms seem to evacuate the
concept of title in property from the entire country, instead of taking cases one by one, as
criminal prosecutions would.
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from the aftermath of violent upheaval;163 or (c) failing to get to the heart
of problems that require more elaborate regulatory, structural, or political
reform.164 In my view, it is highly unlikely that any absolute “one size fits
all” answer exists for these sorts of questions, such that we can
definitively declare that: civil liability is per se preferable; criminal
prosecution is invariably ideal; both are necessary in concert; or,
alternative regulatory arrangements are categorically superior to any forms
of judicially imposed accountability.165 Still, in order to even begin
assessing these questions in real-world situations, we first require a
topography of what corporate criminal liability for international crimes
means across different sectors and an awareness of the ways in which
weaker forms of accountability can act as shields against redress that is
more conceptually fitting.166

B.

Avoiding Legal Hurdles, Gaining Legal Tools

The advantages of corporate criminal liability (and individual criminal
liability of corporate officers) are not just conceptual preferences—
corporate criminal liability compensates for the loss of the private right to
sue by offering a series of important substantive benefits the ATS could
not match.
First, processing allegations of human rights violations against
corporations within the ATS often required plaintiffs to overcome a set of
domestic legal concepts that are very alien to the criminal law. In
particular, these include forum non conveniens, act of state and political

163

I address the arguments that ATS litigation over-deterred commerce below. See infra,
section V.B.
164
See, in particular, Moyn supra note 40.
165
In a separate piece, I critique theorists of corporate criminal liability for too quickly
assuming that there are stable answers to these questions that are not sensitive to context.
See Stewart, supra note 28, at 261–299.
166
Harry Ball and Lawrence Friedman, for example, argue that corporate criminal
liability is useful insofar as it allows prosecutors to threaten “the full treatment.” By this,
they imply that corporate transgression might attract all heads of accountability for the
single crime: civil, criminal and regulatory. Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The
Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological
View, 17 STAN. L, REV. 197, 215 (1965). This promise of synergy is conspicuously
unrealized, however, in ATS suits against corporations. To the best of my knowledge, for
all the cases filed against corporations, no parallel prosecutions (of the corporations or
their representatives) have ever materialized.
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question doctrines.167 Each of these doctrine erected barriers that proved
insurmountable for civil litigants in concrete ATS cases. But by contrast,
repositioning these allegations in ICL (enforced primarily through national
courts) allows prosecutors to bypass these legal impediments entirely.
Without doubt, the loss of the ability for individual victims to sue and the
higher burdens of proof in criminal trials are no triviality, but civil
remedies always came with a series of downsides that should better factor
in our assessment of feasible responses to corporate implication in
atrocity.
Second, to these substantive advantages add a system of legal
opportunities to influence prosecutorial discretion, which may at least
partially soften the blow Kiobel has inflicted on the private right to sue.
These opportunities can be generic or case-specific. Taking the generic
type first, recall that international criminal law comes replete with broad
obligations to prosecute international crimes. Conscious of the types of
political influences that so frequently impede accountability for mass
violence, the states that first negotiated the Geneva Conventions enacted
provisions requiring universal jurisdiction, stipulated a duty to investigate
and punish war crimes, and insisted that there is no statute of limitations
for international crimes.168 From a scholarly standpoint, greater
intellectual engagement with each of these areas may well produce strange
new fruit. Some of these devices have apparently distinct implications for
corporate criminal liability, although this point too marks an area
deserving of scholarly attention—the non-applicability of statutes of
limitations has a finite application in its individualistic orientation: all
people die. Corporations, however, can live forever.
In terms of case-specific opportunities to affect prosecutorial
discretion, a range of legal mechanisms allow victims and others to either
subtly force the issue or, more powerfully, to stand in for reluctant state
prosecutors. For example, many civil law countries entertain concepts like
partie civile;169 Germany and other countries have compulsory
167

STEPHENS, supra note 48, at 335–365 (discussing case law governing forum non
conveniens, act of state and political question doctrine in the context of ATS cases). For
another helpful overview, see KOEBELE, supra note 48, at 323–355; K. Gallagher, Civil
Litigation and Transnational Business: An Alien Tort Statute Primer, J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. (2010).
168
For excellent discussions of these features of international criminal law, see YASMIN
NAQVI, IMPEDIMENTS TO EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(2010); RUTH A KOK, STATUTORY LIMITATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(2007).
169
On partie civile in Belgium and France, see MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & JOHN R.
SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 94 (2002). With respect to the relation
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prosecution principles (called Legalitätsprinzip);170 and the notion of
private prosecutions remains in various common law systems.171 Albeit
very imperfectly, these legal advantages may go some distance to at least
minimize the loss of the ATS’s most attractive characteristic—the
independent right to sue. This is especially true if, as others have
observed, these legal mechanisms “can be considered as a comparable
vehicle for ATS-like claims.”172 After all, the Argor-Heraeus case was
initiated by a “denonciation” by a civil society organization within
Switzerland.
To suggest this as a model is not a hopelessly rosy exhortation about
the likelihood of corporate prosecutions; it is a call for deep engagement
in legal questions that, for the ATS at least, remained peripheral. Thus, the
simultaneous contraction of the ATS and rise of corporate responsibility
for international crimes is an invitation to develop a rigorous,
systematized, and comparative understanding of the sorts of devices that
influence prosecutorial discretion, a normative theory delimiting their
between partie civil and international crimes in Europe, see Kaeb & Scheffer, supra note
18, at 859.
170
See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER & MARK KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES,
STATUTES, AND COMMENTS 101–105 (2005) (providing an English-language discussion
of this concept, its conceptual grounding and exceptions to it). See also Markus Dubber,
Comparative Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(OXFORD HANDBOOKS) 1314 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008);
Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, The German System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 292,
338–339 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & John R Spencer eds., 2005).
171
As David Garland has explained, the institution of private prosecutions in England has
“gradually diminished in strength and importance.” DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 32 (2002);
Nonetheless, private prosecutions still appear available for certain crimes. DAVID C.
ORMEROD, J. JOHN CYRIL SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, SMITH & HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 12E
PB 22, 829 and 1026 (2008); Apparently, this may also be true in South Africa. See
JONATHAN M. BURCHELL & JOHN MILTON, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 609 (3rd ed.
2005). Although I do little more than gesture towards these possibilities here, a more farreaching comparative analysis of avenues for private prosecutions globally is precisely
the type of research I hope this move towards corporate responsibility for international
crimes will engender. For illustrations of this type of research, see PHILIP L. REICHEL,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A TOPICAL APPROACH 240 (1999)
(discussing private prosecutions in various jurisdictions). After all, private prosecutions
have played a significant but under-investigated and under-theorized role in the history in
ICL. See e.g., KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (1 ed. 2011) (discussing how “Greek
law permits private prosecution in criminal cases; that is, private citizens are entitled to
file criminal cases.”); Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States / Crimes of Hate: Lessons from
Rwanda, 24 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 365–483, 404 (1999) (asserting that
private prosecutions were also available in Rwanda).
172
Kaeb and Scheffer, supra note 18, at 856.
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optimal design, and empirical programs to test their efficacy. Whether or
not projects of this sort are ever realized, the loss of the private right to sue
does not justify human rights advocates, scholars, states people, or citizens
giving in to a kind of learned helplessness about corporate responsibility
or their role in instigating it post-Kiobel; that type of defeatism overlooks
the “discovery” and rise of a new set of opportunities, which still remain
very poorly explored.

C.

Practical Advantages

We move, then, to the practical. On the one hand, more demanding
rules of evidence and higher standards of proof in criminal trials
unequivocally militate in favor of civil suits. Other strategic factors cut the
other way. Take pillage, the very crime alleged in the Argor-Heraeus case.
From a practical perspective, states frequently (but not invariably) own
natural resources that are pillaged in modern war zones.173 As a result, for
a pillage case to function within an ATS framework to address these
atrocity-enabling dynamics, foreign states would often have to act as
plaintiffs. But is this thinkable? Not only is it unclear whether states ever
had standing to bring a claim under the rubric of the ATS, the economic
dependence of developing nations on corporate multinationals for direct
foreign investment will often impede them exercising that possibility,174
173

STEWART, supra note 3, at 39–52 (discussing ownership of national resources in
national law, the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, indigenous
ownership of natural resources, a rebel group’s ownership of natural resources under its
control, and the relationship between recognition and ownership, concluding that in many
instances, States own natural resources). Nonetheless, it is important to highlight how
natural resources are sometimes owned by private entities, including companies. As such,
pillage is both a sword and shield for corporate interests.
174
Olivier de Schutter makes this point succinctly in a connected context. Olivier De
Schutter, The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European
Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 239–240 (2005) (arguing that “even
when international law imposes on the State hosting the investment to protect its
population from human rights violations, and thus to oblige all actors operating within its
national territory to respect these rights, the host State will typically lack the incentive or
the resources to adopt effective measures in that respect.”). See also, Larissa van den
Herik & Jernej Letnar Černič, Regulating Corporations under International Law: From
Human Rights to International Criminal Law and Back Again, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 725–
743, 728 (2010). (“In situations where a multinational corporation outweighs a
developing host state in terms of economic power, that state may not be inclined to
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especially after mass violence. Because criminal law does not depend on
the foreign state’s initiative or acquiescence, it may appropriately correct
for this power imbalance.
Relatedly, a criminal prosecution may be the only feasible mechanism
for accountability where power politics make the corporation “judgmentproof” in the civil realm.175 To draw a vague parallel I have explored
elsewhere, U.S. prosecutors recently indicted the British weapons giant
BAE Systems for violating the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and making
false statements concerning its compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act,176 when the company’s tremendous political power in
Britain effectively rendered it judgment-proof there for allegedly paying
billion-dollar kick-backs to the Saudi government over a lucrative
weapons deal.177 The point to be taken from this case is that prosecutors
might sometimes have opportunities to charge corporations that have no
equivalent in a civil context, for all sorts of profoundly political reasons
ICL lawyers know too well. Greater attention to corporate responsibility
for international crimes would better showcase these latent possibilities,
such that the relative strengths and weaknesses of the criminal angle are
clear as it moves forward with ATS litigation (and other forms of
accountability) into the future.
For now, the broad lesson is that throwing ones hands up in lament
that Kiobel largely destroys the right to sue corporations for violations of
international law is to miss a potent practical alternative waiting in the
wings.

regulate a corporation too stringently. The investment and economic activity coming
from the multinational may be more appealing to the developing state than the need to
protect its citizens from violations committed by the multinational.”)
175
Khanna rightly argues that “judgment-proof” corporations were one of the core
motivations for corporate criminal liability. We disagree that the opportunities for
corporations to render themselves “judgment-proof” have changed appreciably
throughout the world since the inception of regulatory bodies in the United States,
although in fairness, his argument does not explicitly purport to extend beyond US
borders. Khanna, supra note 26, at 1504. For my own misgivings about this approach,
see Stewart, supra note 28, at 281-282.
176
For helpful summary, see Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97
VA. L. REV. 1775, 1842 (2011). See also, Section III: Business as Usual, in ANDREW
FEINSTEIN, THE SHADOW WORLD: INSIDE THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE (2011) (providing
full background to the case against BAE Systems, including its evasion of accountability
within the United Kingdom).
177
Id.
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V. CORPORATE GUILT AS A NEW RATIONALE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Debates about the ATS were many and important, but they
understandably left out a core idea that the criminal law will provide—
guilt. For obvious reasons, this concept never featured within visions of
ATS litigation that were bound up in tort law, international relations or a
business and human rights agenda. As things transpire, however, many of
those who call for stronger forms of corporate accountability for human
rights abuses are probably fairly described as “closet retributivists.”178
Significantly, recasting human rights cases that rise to the level of
international crimes as corporate crimes allows us to make these
retributive aspirations explicit, as a new possibility for justifying this form
of corporate accountability.178a In this Part, I point to these underlying
retributive intuitions, show how retribution is not necessarily the
inhumane cry for revenge that many suppose, and demonstrate how the
criminal law provides an appropriate vehicle in whose name “closet
retributivists” can safely “come out.” In fact, as we will see momentarily,
a deontological vision of responsibility cuts through much of the criticism
that tied ATS cases down.
A.

“Closet Retributivism” in Business and Human Rights

By and large, arguments for and against the ATS were fought on
consequentialist turf. In April 2013, for example, Judge Pierre Leval set
out what were, in his estimation, the true purposes of ATS litigation.
According to the judge, universal civil jurisdiction of this sort is helpful
because

178

Michael Moore, one of the leading modern theorists of criminal law, uses this term to
describe unresolved intuitions about responsibility and punishment. Moore, supra note
38.
178a
I accept, of course, that corporations can violate all sorts of human rights short of
perpetrating international crimes, meaning that international criminal justice offers only a
partial solution to the wider problem of corporate accountability. For helpful commentary
to this effect, see van den Herik & Černič, supra note 173, at 741 (“corporate
responsibility under international criminal law could never subsume the human rights
concept which has much broader implications.”) Necessarily, this is only part of a
response to the problem of accountability within the business and human rights context,
but it is arguably a solution that goes to the most egregious violations. Recall, also, that
the ATS was always limited to “widely accepted, clearly defined violations” of
international law, which also excluded some human rights norms.
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keeping courts open to civil suits about human rights can
bring solace and compensation to victims. More important,
these suits draw global attention to atrocities, and in so doing
perhaps deter would-be abusers. And they give substance to a
body of law that is crucial to a civilized world yet so underenforced that it amounts to little more than a pious sham.179
While this inventory of benefits is undeniably compelling, critics point to
a range of countervailing costs associated with ATS litigation, usually of
an economic and political type.180 Nonetheless, both sets of arguments
were always intensely utilitarian in form, overlooking the rationale most
criminal theorists would offer for prosecuting criminals—wrongdoers
deserve punishment because they are guilty. Thus, by focusing on
retribution, I play down debates about the legitimacy and efficacy of the
ATS scheme, although admittedly, my approach echoes Sarah Cleveland’s
observation within these discussions, that “corporations that wish the ATS
would go away are simply ignoring the availability of other legal
mechanisms to reach this type of conduct.”181
To begin, note how many in this field harbor retributive intuitions,
without ever claiming them as such. In 2011, Professor John Ruggie, the
then United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative for
179

Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 2013,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138810/pierre-n-leval/the-long-arm-ofinternational-law (last visited Jan 22, 2014).
180
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 38 (2003) (predicting grave financial implications for the
US and global economies if ATS suits continued unchecked); Bradley and Goldsmith,
supra note 132; Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2004) (arguing
that for functional, policy or pragmatic reasons, the Executive if far better placed to deal
with the concerns that animate the ATS than courts); Abebe, supra note 102 (employing
political realism to argue that ATS suits would “complicate the achievement of the
United States’ normative and strategic foreign policy goals.”); Sykes, supra note 88
(using economics to suggest that the ATS could lead to a net dimunition of respect for
human rights); Bradley, supra note 132 (carefully pointing to democratic and political
costs that derive from ATS litigation); Bellinger, supra note 132 (same); For skillful
responses to these criticisms, see Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How
Corporate Complicity Liability under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive
Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 208 (2008) (criticizing many of the assumptions
about the impact of ATS litigation); Knowles, supra note 133 (employing realism to
problematize whether ATS cases really undermine US interests); Sarah H. Cleveland,
The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV.
971 (2003) (arguing that ATS litigation does not harm US interests nearly as much as
others pretend, or that it is exceptional relative to other available schemes).
181
Id., at 982.
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Business and Human Rights, presented his final report on business and
human rights. In response, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International
and a host of other civil society organizations issued a joint statement
objecting that Ruggie’s approach to issues of accountability was
insufficiently progressive.182 For this consortium of critics, one of the
main perceived shortcomings included the need to place greater emphasis
on the obligation for States to “prevent, investigate, punish and redress
business-related human rights abuse”.183 This insistence on punishment
could be read as retributive, especially if punishment exists independently
of the need for redress or wider aspirations for compliance with human
rights precepts.
In another example, retribution features less as a grounds for
accountability, and more as a basis for calculating the type and quantum
of a judicial response. In 2008, a British National Contact Point for the
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises heard a case against a
company named Afrimex.184 In that case, Afrimex was alleged to have
182

See Human Rights Watch et al., Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), http://www.businesshumanrights.org/Links/Repository/1003963/jump. The essence of the dispute seems to
revolve around the need for a new treaty governing human rights rather than misgivings
about accountability as such. For instance, Principle 25 of the Ruggie Principles
mandated that “[a]s part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights
abuse, States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative,
legislative or other appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their territory
and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.” U.N. Special
Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
Ruggie also concluded his six-year mandate by calling for greater attention to corporate
responsibility for international crimes. See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
GLOBAL ETHICS SERIES) 200 (2013) (“[n]ational jurisdictions have divergent
interpretations of the applicability to business enterprises of international standards
prohibiting gross human rights abuses, potentially amounting to international crimes.
Such abuses occur most frequently in situations where the human rights regime cannot be
expected to function as intended, such as armed conflict. Greater legal clarity is needed
for victims and business enterprises alike.”)
183
Id., at 2 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the Statement also includes the following
argument: “States should adopt and implement effective regulatory measures to prevent,
put an end to and punish business abuses of human rights at home and in other
countries”. I am also inclined to read this reference to punishment as suggesting
retribution, particularly when it follows immediately on from regulatory measures to
prevent and put an end to corporate human rights abuses.
184
Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines For
Multinational Enterprises: Afrimex (Uk) Ltd, URN 08/1209, 28 August 2008. In the
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illegally exploited natural resources from the Democratic Republic of
Congo (“DRC”) during a resource war Madeline Albright once dubbed
“Africa’s First World War.”185 Perplexingly, however, having found that
Afrimex was responsible for violating the OECD Guidelines, the U.K.
National Contact Point merely thanked the company for offering to
formulate a corporate responsibility policy document “to shape its actions
going forward.”186 Aside from the public shaming, this was the only
penalty visited upon the company. For many, this sanction will seem
patently inadequate, especially if the underlying conduct also constituted
the war crime of pillage.
At the end of WWII, a German businessman Pleiger received a prison
sentence of 15 years for his prodigious pillage of Polish coal over the
course of the conflict. By sharp contrast, an English company that appears
to have engaged in legally comparable conduct in modern Africa escaped
serious consequences with a direction to Ruggie’s influential work and
some polite pressure to develop a strategy that conforms with the
insightful principles he has espoused.187 Thus, even though the NCP
process is a valuable “calling to account,”188 it seems inadequate on its
face—the “verdict” produces a sharp sense of injustice, since the sanction
inflicted on the company is woefully incommensurate with its
wrongdoing. Here once more, the retributive intuition repeats;
United Kingdom, this National Contact Point is housed within the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills. Very recently, it was conferred the power to hear
arguments from civil society and issue public opinions, which makes it the most
progressive of its type.
185
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, WELCOMING REMARKS AT THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 1 (2000),
http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000124.html (“Because of that nation’s
location and size, and because of the number of countries involved, the conflict there
could be described as Africa’s first world war.”). Gérard Prunier, arguably the leading
historian of the region, has also employed the metaphor. See GERARD PRUNIER, AFRICA’S
WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AND THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL
CATASTROPHE (2009).
186
Afrimex Case, supra note 184.
187
The UK National Contact Point’s concluding “recommendation” starts as follows:
“Afrimex offered to formulate a corporate responsibility policy document to shape its
actions going forward. The NCP thanks Afrimex for this suggestion and understand that
the work is underway on this document. In creating this corporate responsibility
document, the NCP draws Afrimex’s attention to the US Special Representative on the
issue of Human Rights’ recent report: ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for
Business and Human Rights’”. Id, at 14.
188
“Calling to account” is a key element of Antony Duff’s explanation of the criminal
trial. To my mind, the Afrimex case suggests that calling to account is necessary but
insufficient for criminal justice. ANTONY DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY
AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW (2007).
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proportionality in punishment is a fundamental tenet of retributive
thinking.189 So, when considering either the rationale for accountability or
the sentence meted out, retribution does important but unacknowledged
work.
Perhaps retribution was overlooked precisely because the ATS
originated amongst human rights lawyers. One could certainly understand
why a method inspired by human rights might take a purely
consequentialist view of criminal trials; over the past decades much
human rights literature has used “compliance” as the overarching
objective.190 Indeed, a set of prominent human rights scholars have
developed sophisticated models for measuring human rights compliance
by states, offering compelling arguments for prioritizing acculturation,
coercion, and persuasion in different contexts.191 By extrapolation to the
corporation in war zones, applying this method to the problem of global
corporate governance involves identifying projects and initiatives that will
improve companies’ respect for human rights norms into the future. For
the criminal theorist, however, this approach leaves something important
out.
What do we do about corporate guilt for past offending? If a company
does ten unspeakably evil things in, say, Angola, which amount to clear
instances of international crimes, then through a perfect process of human
rights acculturation comes to mend their wicked ways thereafter, do we
just forget about the ten atrocities they participated in? A former serial
murderer cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that she has
discontinued her earlier criminal campaign (i.e. is now “compliant”), so
offering that possibility to corporate war criminals seems incongruous to
189

Proportionality is a core element of retributive notions of punishment, perhaps best
reflected in the Hegelian view that “[t]he cancellation of crime is retribution in so far as
the latter, by its concept, is an infringement of an infringement, and in so far as crime, by
its existence, has a determinative qualitative and quantitative magnitude, so that its
negation, as existent, also has a determinate magnitude.” MICHAEL TONRY, WHY
PUNISH? HOW MUCH?: A READER ON PUNISHMENT 46 (2010) citing G.W.F Hegel,
Wrong [Das Unrecht]. See also, Andrew Von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy
of Punishment, CRIME AND JUSTICE 55–98 (1992).
190
RYAN GOODMAN & THOMAS INNES PEGRAM, HUMAN RIGHTS, STATE COMPLIANCE,
AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ASSESSING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2012); Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1870 (2002)
(assessing literature on “compliance” with treaty law generally, then developing tests for
“compliance” specific to human rights treaties); Harold Hongju Koh, How is
International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999) (containing a
section heading entitled “From Compliance to Obedience”).
191
See, in particular, the helpful table summarizing these core arguments in Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
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the point of objection. In other words, basic notions of (retributive) justice
dictate that the CSR or Business and Human Rights movements cannot
expunge past wrongdoing out of a laudable commitment to future
compliance. Joining the UN Global Compact, establishing a human rights
award or initiating the Kimberley Process are all praiseworthy initiatives,
but they do not wipe the slate of history clean or act as a shield against law
enforcement—justice still matters in concrete cases, above and beyond
systemic questions of compliance.192
Again, these intuitions are fundamentally retributive. In a famous
passage in his defense of retribution, Immanuel Kant argues that if a
community on an island decided to dissolve itself, the last prisoner on the
island should be executed beforehand, “so that everyone will duly receive
what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be
fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the
punishment.”193 If this reference to execution makes modern human rights
lawyers cringe, Kant’s underlying argument does offer a hidden
justification for stronger notions of corporate accountability for its own
sake—sometimes corporations and/or their representatives deserve to be
punished. From this perspective, international criminal law
(predominantly enforced in national courts) might offer an apparatus for
insisting on accountability that better squares with popular visions of
justice.
None of this is to say that corporate criminal cases of this sort will be a
walk in the park, that I have come close to defending retribution or that
ATS litigation offered no retributive value; it is merely to make conscious
the retributive ideation beneath the surface. Once exposed, this ideation
should stimulate new debate, especially when the reorientation of ATS

192

Interestingly, the example Ruti Teitel and Rob Howse offer for the need to think
beyond the compliance narrative is diametrically opposite to those operative in this field,
but I suspect that they would welcome my scenario as bolstering their thesis too. Robert
Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really
Matters, 1 GLOB. POLICY 127–136, 131 (2010) (“The broad political and economic
considerations that might be served by integrating Serbia into the European Union have
been almost entirely overshadowed by the concern that Serbia has failed adequately to
cooperate with the ICTY prosecution of war criminals. Indeed, compliance has become
the central issue with respect to Serbian accession to the EU, where ‘compliance’ with
international law is viewed as a surrogate for or symbol of political ‘cooperation’”). In
my instance, economic and political considerations have crowded out international
criminal responsibility, but as I say, I suspect both examples evidence the shortcomings
of compliance as the be-all and end-all of international law.
193
IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140 (1999).
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suits towards the criminal law produces marked departures from earlier
thinking.
B.

A Deontological Response to ATS Critics

In all likelihood, a deontological perspective grounded in moral
responsibility (as distinct from a consequentialist vision set in economics
or international relations), will offer different answers to core criticisms of
ATS suits.
First, consider over-deterrence. During the South African Apartheid
litigation brought under the ATS, the Bush administration argued that
aiding and abetting liability “would surely deter many businesses from
such economic engagement.”194 Likewise, Alan Sykes has argued that
liability schemes walk a thin line between understating harm (thereby
failing to force business to internalize the full cost of doing business) and
overstating harm (thus creating costs to the business that are excessive,
especially when it must take burdensome precautions to avoid that
harm).195 In Professor Sykes view, ATS litigation fell on the wrong side of
this balance; it imposed significant avoidance costs without making a
difference as to whether atrocities took place or not. Chinese companies,
which are practically immune from the discriminatory ATS regime, will
(and do) assist brutal regimes when Western businesses withdraw from
volatile countries to avoid these suits.196 Thus, ATS liability is
“undesirable because [it] will induce employers to take measures to avert
liability that are socially wasteful.”197
For the retributivist, however, this reasoning is unconvincing as an
argument against accountability. For one reason, it runs counter to Kant’s
imperative that no one should be treated as a means for some wider
sociological project. As Richard Herz has eloquently argued, the
foregoing seems to place formally immutable human rights on the same

194

Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
13, Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, 509 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-2141CV, 05-2336-CV).
195
Sykes, supra note 88, at 2186-2187.
196
To substantiate, I think very fairly, the point about other corporate actors moving in
where Western companies are forced to withdraw for fear of liability, Sykes cites the
Talisman case in Sudan. He points out how, “[f]ollowing Talisman’s departure, Chinese
companies moved in and dominated the market.”) Id. at 2195. (Parentheses omitted).
197
Id. at 2188.
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scales as economic interests.198 But can these things be weighed against
each other? If we give individuals rights, it seems difficult to understand
how one could demand that any victim sacrifice herself in the name of
improving economic efficiency, even if the number of victims was minute
and the efficiency dividends marked. In other words, the utilitarianism
inherent in economic argument sits uncomfortably with a deontological
notion of rights, which retributive accounts of criminal responsibility take
seriously. On this alternative framing, the task is to construct a morally
defensible notion of international blame attribution (including complicity),
then let responsibility attach where it may. If, as a result, companies baulk
at the prospect of working in South Africa or Sudan, this is less of a
priority for the retributivist than holding the guilty to account.
Second, the argument that ATS litigation seldom makes a concrete
difference to human rights compliance on the ground seems to miss a
major moral problem at the heart of atrocity. To stay with Professor
Sykes, he argues that “the implicit premise is that when such assistance
[from a business to a human rights violator] is withheld, the likelihood or
seriousness of the harmful act will be diminished.”199 This premise, he
says, is false. “Nothing will be gained” he argues, “if aiders and abettors
are held liable for helping wrongdoers who could have obtained the same
help elsewhere”.200 Indeed, by deterring actors from Western democracies,
this type of responsibility may just tie brutal regimes to companies from
China and elsewhere, leading to a net diminution of human rights
compliance on the ground. In this light, Sykes claims that the corporations
that are technically complicit in human rights violations “do not ‘cause’
the repressive acts.”201
Yet, this reasoning is not consistent of the causal principles criminal
courts will apply in these types of cases, which defer to moral principle
over net outcomes. As I have argued elsewhere in far greater depth, most
atrocities are causally overdetermined in the same sense Sykes cites; there
are usually multiple sufficient causes for any given atrocity.202
198

Herz, supra note 180, at 226 (arguing, also, that even if societal interests could trump
human rights, that social benefit would not only have to be “large and unequivocal”,
some legitimate authority (rather than the corporation concerned) should make the
decision.).
199
Id. at 2188.
200
Id. at 2189.
201
Id. at 2203.
202
James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189–1218
(2012). In that Article, I use several examples from the commercial sector to illustrate
these causal problems in action, including the responsibility of corporations in Apartheid
South Africa and the responsibility of the notorious arms vendor Viktor Bout, who
responded to the complaint that his weapons sales had helped kill the better part of a
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Perpetrators of mass violence often make sufficient but unnecessary
contributions to unspeakable violence, mainly because brutal political or
military groups furnish willing substitutes if any particular member
defects, thus guaranteeing the commission of the crime. In fact, in my
earlier study of causal overdetermination as applied to international
criminal justice, I surmised that at least part of what Hannah Arendt
famously calls “the banality of evil” is that terrible violence often involves
playing a consequentially benign part in a wider horror that would take
place regardless of one’s participation;203 what makes radical evil so banal
is that the most terrible individual actions frequently make no discernable
difference.
I resist the temptation to expand terribly much on causal
overdetermination here, except to insist that philosophers unanimously
agree that a causally overdetermined contribution to a crime is a perfectly
sufficient basis for holding one responsible for that offense.204 Justifying
quite why this is the case has given rise to a range of explanations (some

million Angolans, by remarking that “If I didn’t do it, someone else would.” N.
Schmidle, 'Disarming Viktor Bout', The New Yorker (5 March 2012), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/05/120305fa_fact_schmidle (last visited 4
June, 2012).
203
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1992). My projection onto the phrase “banality of evil” is not so far from the meaning
David Luban ascribes to the term. See David Luban, State Criminality and the Ambition
of the International Court of Justice, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE
WRONGDOING 61–91, 61 (Tracy Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011) (citing Arendt’s
responsibility and Judgement in Jerome Kohn (ed) (New York: Schocken Books, 2003),
at 159 for the following meaning: “the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a
gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology,
or ideological conviction in the doer.”).
204
After reviewing the philosophical literature addressing causal overdetermination,
Michael Moore concludes that, while a justification for this sufficient understanding of
causation is no mean feat, “[t]o my knowledge, no one denies these causal conclusions.”
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS kindle 6052 (2009). The recurrent theme in these discussions is
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn exclamation “the simple step of a simple courageous man is not
to take part in the lie, not to support deceit. Let the lie come into the world, even
dominate the world, but not through me.” See Jonathan Glover & M. J. Scott-Taggart, It
Makes no Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49 P. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 171–209 (1975)
(discussing what he calls “The Solzhenitsyn Principle”); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ,
COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 128, 190–191 (2000) (discussing
the Solzhenitsyn Principle, in the context of the accomplice liability of arms vendors);
John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW AND PHILOS. 127–141, 127 (2007)
(using Solzhenitsyn’s quote as an epigraph for his treatment of causation in complicity).
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more controversial than others).205 I here offer only one, since it succinctly
reveals how criminal law is likely to produce a very different result to that
Professor Sykes reasonably endorses in a civil context.
Using an arms dealer who is fungible for numerous willing substitutes
in a vibrant international market as his example, John Gardner explains
that
we should not allow the arms dealer to get away with the idea
that, by dealing arms, he made no difference to the overall
incidence of the wrongdoing. In the relevant sense of “overall
difference”, he did make an overall difference. He added his
own arms dealings. True, he also subtracted like arms dealing
by others, by competitors of his who would have filled the
space in the arms market if he had moved into another line of
work. But he cannot be allowed simply to treat the
subtraction as cancelling out the addition, as yielding a zero
sum. That is an abdication of responsibility. It is an
abdication of responsibility because it is a refusal to accept
that the relationship he has to his own wrongs is different
from the relationship that he has to his competitors’
wrongs.206

205

In particular, causal overdetermination was a principal factor in Richard Wright’s
championing of the so-called Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set (NESS) theory of
causation. See Richard Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
1735 (1985); Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal
Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (2001). The
German orthodoxy, however, approaches these questions from a quite different
perspective, although it arrives at similar conclusions. See Friedrich Toepel, Causal
Overdetermination, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY” 111–132
(Benedikt
Kahmen
&
Markus
Stepanians
eds.,
2013),
http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/186402 (last visited Aug 4, 2014); Professor
Wright has also defended his account of causation against these criticisms. See Richard
Wright, The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms, in CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON “CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY” 13–66 (Benedikt Kahmen & Markus
Stepanians eds., 2013), http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/186402 (last visited Aug
4, 2014). To my mind, Derek Parfit offers the most brilliant explanation for why
overdetermined contributions are still blameworthy, but his conclusion casts a very wide
net. See Derek Parfit, Five Problems of Moral Mathematics, in REASONS AND PERSONS
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp 67 – 87 (inviting us to accept that those
who make imperceptibly small contributions to joint harm are still responsible for that
harm when operating in collective constructs).
206
John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW AND PHILOS. 127–141, 139
(2007).
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On the back of this sort of reasoning, the doctrinal question for ICL is not
so much whether the business (or its representatives) made a difference to
an atrocity in a counterfactual sense, as is the common critique of ATS
litigation; it is whether the business or its representatives participated in
one.207 Unfortunately, because the answer to that question is frequently
affirmative, guilt often attaches to the company, it’s representatives, or
both.208
Three words to qualify the foregoing. First, the preceding argument is
not a criticism of Professor Sykes position, since his excellent piece is
very sensitive to differences between civil accountability and other
branches of law in precisely the sorts of ways I recommend here. In one
such instance, for example, he asserts that “[e]conomic considerations
may not be the only relevant policy considerations, but it would be
exceedingly peculiar to suggest that the economic costs and benefits of
liability under the ATS are wholly irrelevant to the wisdom of liability as
a policy matter.”209 I agree with both aspects of this proposition—moral
207

International criminal courts and tribunals apply this logic in practice. See e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No.SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 522 (“it is
well-settled that a ‘substantial effect’ is not a ‘but for’ cause or a ‘condition precedent.’”;
Ntawukulilyayo v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-82-A, Judgement, 2011
(“Whether a particular contribution qualifies as ‘substantial’ is a ‘fact-based inquiry’, and
need not ‘serve as condition precedent for the commission of the crime’”); Prosecutor v.
Blagojević and Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (2007) (“The Appeals
Chamber, however, has already held that it is not required that the act of assistance serve
as a condition precedent for the commission of the crime”). In many national systems, a
separate less culpable notion of complicity exists for non-essential complicitous
contributions, but it still holds those responsible for these non-essential crimes
responsible for one and the same consummated offence. For thirteen examples from
South America, for instance, see JUAN BUSTOS RAMIREZ & MANUEL VALENZUELA
BEJAS, LE SYSTEME PENAL DES PAYS DE L’AMERIQUE LATINE: AVEC REFERENCE AU
CODE PENAL TYPE LATINO-AMERICAIN 128–130 (1983) (setting out examples of
complicity rules that formally distinguish essential from non-essential forms of
assistance).
208
I am attracted to James Gobert’s argument that if a corporation is an entity that can
support moral responsibility, it is frequently a co-perpetrator or accomplice of
international crimes along with its employees. See James Gobert, Squaring the Circle:
The Relationship between Individual and Organisational Liability, in EUROPEAN
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 139–157, 146 (2011) (arguing that
the corporation and its employees are frequently complicit in one another’s crimes.) The
addition of co-perpetration is my own, since one must assume that in many instances, the
two actors share full responsibility for the consummated crime, especially where they are
both implicated in planning and execution phases of the commission. On the theory of
co-perpetration (far more than complicity) see MICHAEL BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A
PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER (2014).
209
Sykes, supra note 88, at 2164.
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responsibility provides another set of relevant considerations, and
economic implications of any corporate accountability scheme are
tremendously important. The great difficulty, however, is that before now,
the moral implications of corporate offending have not featured in the
debate at all, effectively foreclosing the opportunity to decide how intense
our retributive brand of justice should be. Somewhat surprisingly, the
weight to place on corporate guilt for atrocity is a debate that we are yet to
have.
Second, retribution does not preclude simultaneously pointing to the
positive consequentialist outcomes that trials will generate. With respect
to deterrence, for example, leading experts of corporate criminal liability
argue that whereas criminal law as applied to individuals frequently
exacerbates the social dislocation that leads to crime in the first place,
“corporations are more likely to react positively to criminal stigma by
attempting to repair their images and regain public confidence.”210 As a
result, corporations may be more deterrable than individuals in some
circumstances.211 As such, corporate criminal liability offers very new
opportunities for deterring atrocity,212 which tend to remain seriously
under-appreciated in the literature on international criminal justice, which
is almost exclusively oriented towards individuals and individuals
alone.213 Retribution does not discount these important consequences, it
just makes them secondary to a strict calculation of what the corporation
and its representatives deserve.
Third, criminal trials can certainly coexist with civil litigation, claims
for restitution, CSR initiatives of all stripes, regulatory responses like the
Dodd-Frank Act, and broad-based programs that seek to infuse human
210

Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault,
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1153–1154 (1983). In the same vein, Walsh &
Pyrich note that corporate criminal convictions can strongly impact consumer purchasing
decisions, and that criminal conviction may have other effects such as barring a
corporation from certain kinds of business activity. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich,
Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation
Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 635 (1995).
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SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 36 (2002).
212
In fairness, not everyone shares this view. For example, though Eli Lederman is open
to considering “self-identity” models of corporate criminal liability, he views individual
liability as a more compelling and efficient deterrent. Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing
Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and
the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 641, 702 (2000).
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Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities? 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 10 (2001); David Wippman, Atrocities,
Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 474
(1999); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or
Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 832 (2006).
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rights into corporate cultures. Insisting that the guilty be held accountable
does not necessarily crowd out alternatives that could also deal with the
problem. Nevertheless, if human rights advocates (and citizens at large)
desire more proportionate forms of corporate accountability for human
rights violations, international criminal justice not only offers a platform
to satisfy those desires, it also supplies an obvious but unexplored
rationale for exercising that power. Needless to say, none of the forgoing
justifies retribution or solves Samuel Moyn’s concern that sensationalized
accountability will overwhelm wiser attempts at addressing root causes of
human rights offending.214 However, to return to one of my central
themes, merely pointing to retribution inserts an overlooked argument for
corporate accountability, which has important but under-appreciated
normative implications. At the same time, retribution claims supremacy
over the consequentialist rationale that always dominated discussions of
the ATS scheme.
C.

Retribution and Human Rights

There is much to be said for and against retribution, including in
ICL.215 I largely set that debate aside here, in favor of a brief attempt at
showcasing the plausibility of retribution for human rights advocates. I do
this since I suspect that, in the minds of many, the two are not comfortable
bedfellows.
In fact, some prominent authors argue that only retribution adequately
respects the human dignity human rights conventions sanctify. In a
typically elegant essay written in 1949, the novelist C.S. Lewis chastised
the so-called “humanitarian” notion of punishment (viz. the idea that
214

See infra notes 40 and 41.
MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 150–168
(2007); Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 70–74 (2007) (both expressing skepticism about retribution as a
basis for punishment). Both of these accounts seem to focus exclusively on the
justification of punishment by international institutions. It is unclear whether the analysis
would change if national courts are punishing their own nationals for international crimes
perpetrated abroad, or if corporate defendants were substituted for individuals. Both
authors also disfavor retribution because of the selectivity inherent in international
criminal prosecutions. I confess that I have never found that reasoning altogether
convincing. I am grateful to Victor Tadros on this score who, articulating my misgivings
better than I could, asked: “if three people rob a bank and for various political and
circumstantial reasons, you can only apprehend one, is retribution no longer a sound
rationale for punishing that one defendant because the two others escaped?”
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criminal punishment should be used as an instrument for moral education
or psychic treatment) as both inherently demeaning and politically
dangerous.216 For Lewis, “the concept of Desert is the only connecting
link between punishment and justice,”217 and dispensing with this linkage,
especially in the name of mercy and humanitarianism, “means that each
one of us, from the moment he breaks the law, is deprived of the rights of
a human being.”218
True, retribution fell out of favor in the post-war period, where leading
authors dismissed the philosophy as either “primitive” or “infantile”.219
But very soon thereafter, alternative models of punishment that viewed
criminal justice as a gateway to treatment, rehabilitation or moral
education fell from grace, sparking a resurgence of the retributive ideal.220
Thus, in discussing corporate accountability on an international stage, we
must also recognize that retribution is presently the dominant rationale for
punishment globally.221 Therefore, reprocessing ATS-type cases against
216
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commercial actors within a retributive vision of ICL offers a better vehicle
for realizing modern justifications for criminal justice, which may
simultaneously resonate with foundational ideas in the theory of human
rights.
Admittedly, isolating the precise rationale for privileging human
beings as a species is a challenge for philosophers of human rights: a
coherent answer to that question has to exclude animals and include “tiny
babies, humans who suffer from profound disabilities, the very old and the
demented who have lost any capacity for reasoned thought or the ability to
understand the living of their lives.”222 Unsurprisingly, there are a number
of competing solutions to this riddle. Some, for instance, argue that human
rights are God-given natural rights;223 others view them as a byproduct of
humans’ superior cognitive capacities; whereas others still, suggest that
the search for firm conceptual ground in human rights is hopeless, to the
point that it merely distracts us from the sentimentalism (or politics more
broadly) that really work in affecting social change.224 At least since Kant,
though, moral agency has served as a serious contender among these
theories of human rights.225 So, according to this theory at least, the moral
U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2000) (“A striking feature of penal philosophising during the last
thirty years has been the revival of retributivism.”).
222
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223
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224
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means of discussion and compromise. Far better, I would argue, to forgo these kinds of
foundational arguments altogether and seek to build support for human rights on the basis
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225
In modern times, Alan Gewirth is arguably the most prominent exponent of this view.
Drawing on Kant, Gewirth argues that moral agency serves as the conceptual essence
human rights should protect. Alan Gewirth, The Epistemology of Human Rights, 1 SOC.
PHIL & POLICY (1984). For compelling criticisms of Gewirth, although not criticisms that
go to moral agency directly, see Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without Foundations, SSRN
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agency retributivists view as cardinal to criminal punishment may very
well turn out to be the characteristic of human beings we create
international human rights law to protect.
My purpose here is to raise rather than defend this possibility of direct
correspondence between retribution and human rights.226 In part, I am
motivated to (partially) sooth any cognitive dissonance the idea of
retribution might produce for human rights advocates, but significantly
more importantly, to highlight the need for a new dialogue that takes
retribution seriously as a justification of corporate criminal liability in
ICL.227 If a robust debate of this sort ensues, corporate responsibility for
international crimes may help human rights advocates, scholars and critics
forge a clearer understanding about the need for corporate accountability
in a global context, and by implication, their own roles agitating for (or
against) it. In all these respects, a shift to the type of retributive thinking
only a criminal system can fully deliver has important implications that
cry out for more of the attention the ATS traditionally enjoyed—from
scholars, members of civil society, businesspeople, and citizens.
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4 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=999874 (last visited Sep 9, 2011). Instead,
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE PATH AHEAD
In 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the then heterodox practice
of trying corporations for crimes. Since that time, the strange practice of
employing criminal law to punish corporations has caught on throughout
most of the world, as states attempt to reign in the ever increasing might
of corporate actors. Chronologically speaking, the profusion of corporate
criminal liability across most of the globe coincided with the rise of the
Alien Tort Statute, and both trends were born of a common anxiety—
corporate impunity. With the relative demise of the latter, the former
grows in stature, especially when the underappreciated criminal angle
always enjoyed certain competitive advantages over its more popular civil
sibling. Viewed from the ATS’s perspective, the rise of corporate criminal
liability will simultaneously appear as an exercise in mimicry and
transcendence. Aside from the commonalities between the two systems we
have witnessed here, marrying corporate criminal liability and
international crimes also offers new responses to old criticisms of the ATS
process. Overall, the understandable tendency to anticipate the
consequences of these trials economically or geopolitically is tempered by
the aspiration that the guilty should be held accountable. This is not to say
that corporate criminal responsibility is anywhere near a panacea for all
the woes of corporate misconduct internationally; on the contrary, it is a
call for greater intellectual engagement with ICL alongside a wider set of
regulatory initiatives and political programs. If the facts support the
allegations leveled against Argor-Heraeus, that particular investigation
may help break new ground in this regard. If it does not, others will
certainly follow. Whatever happens, the very fact of a formal investigation
has confirmed the plausibility of the project, and consequently, the birth of
a fledgling field.

78

